North Ossetia and South Ossetia are both populated by ethnic Ossetians speaking different dialects of one language. Kinship relations between them are frequent.
It has been a common practice to purchase living space both in the North and South lately. Correspondingly, it is often difficult to trace migration from South to North, as many live in both republics.
The state symbols of the two republics - flags and coats of arms - are also the same, only the anthems being different.
The idea of unification of the two Ossetias is a favourite issue of politicians during election campaigns in both republics (particularly in the south).
For example, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoyty said in June 2006, five months before the presidential election, that "the final aim of our struggle is to restore historic justice, unite North Ossetia and South Ossetia, and join the Russian Federation".
However, there is almost nothing behind this populist statement, because there are more differences than similarities between societies in the two republics.
They include significant differences between South Ossetia and North Ossetia, which are linked to Georgia. For North Ossetians, Georgia is a neighbour, with whom it is possible to establish relations and to work and there are, in most cases, no controversial issues. In the meantime, the South Ossetians have a negative view of relations with Georgia, particularly because of the conflict in August 2008.
North and South Ossetians also differ in their attitudes towards Russia.
The Beslan tragedy in 2004, for example, became a significant landmark. More than 330 hostages, mostly children, were killed then in a special operation, which was supposed to rescue them.
Since the Beslan tragedy, the politically active part of North Ossetia has been quite critical of the Russian ruling class and then Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In November 2007, for example, a local newspaper published a manifesto by a politician well known in North Ossetia, Vissarion Aseyev, who sharply criticised the Russian government. The Ossetian politician declared his intention "to create a sovereign, flourishing, and democratic Ossetian state through political and legal means". Aseyev won support from hundreds of voters in the North Ossetian parliamentary election.
At the time when this tragedy took place in North Ossetia, it would be impossible to imagine a politician in South Ossetia criticising Russia or Putin. Moreover, the South Ossetian government openly declared their desire to join the Russian Federation.
This concrete situation found absolutely different responses in South Ossetia and North Ossetia.
The wars in South Ossetia mostly "remained someone else's wars" for North Ossetia like the Beslan tragedy was "someone else's tragedy" for South Ossetia.
It is impossible to confirm any essential involvement of North Ossetians in the South Ossetia conflict before August 2008.
No more than dozens of people from the North volunteered to participate in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in the 1990s.
The North Ossetians traditionally regard their own political conservatism and the absence of separatist aspirations to secede from Russia as advantageous and wise, which ensures a certain level of stability for them. Correspondingly, they often condemned South Ossetian separatism and accused the South Ossetians of generating their own problems at least before the August 2008 war.
One of the North Ossetian journalists recently wrote in his blog: "Time has come to admit that we are effectively not at al interested in what is happening in South Ossetia. We do not like them. We live in Russia and have a lot of our own problems. What we have from them are only noise and headache".
The inflow of refugees from Georgia in the early 1990s had a major impact on the negative attitude of the North Ossetians towards their southern brothers. The migration gave rise to economic and other problems in the republic.
Another difference between the two republics is religious in nature. The Ossetians are traditionally not deeply religious. However, Christianity and Islam are acquiring an increasingly clear-cut shape among the Ossetian public and in the Ossetian political culture.
South Ossetia has almost no Islamic traditions, while Islam was the religion of the elite of the public in North Ossetia.
If we take a look at the current political elite in North Ossetia, we will see that traditionally, members of the Muslim Ossetian clan are broadly represented in the government structures of the republic.
Given the policy pursued by the Russian state in the North Caucasus, religious issues will become increasingly important, including in relations between North Ossetia and South Ossetia.
Economic ties between the two republics have also become complicated. For example, it is now prohibited to export timber from South Ossetia into North Ossetia. In the meantime, South Ossetia has big reserves of beech. South Ossetia cannot have economic ties with Georgia and it follows that by taking this decision, Russia is keeping South Ossetia under an economic blockade. North Ossetia has the potential to influence some of the Kremlin's decision, but it is not doing so.
Experts in both republics admit that the level of consolidation between North Ossetia and South Ossetia is very low.
"For example, Armenia's current national idea is completely oriented on Nagorny Karabakh. The entire national movement was based on the struggle for Karabakh, which was not the case in North Ossetia. People do not have the feeling here that the South is an independent republic," North Ossetian expert Igor Dulayev said.
North Ossetian President Mamsurov also admits this. In an interview to the Russian media, he once said: "When I and Dzhabeyevich (Eduard Kokoyty) talk sincerely, I tell him: 'I cannot imagine that South Ossetia is indeed a state'".
The terminology used in the article belongs to the author and not “Liberali”.
The article is prepared with support of Heinrich Boell Foundation. The publication statements and ideas do not necessarily express the Heinrich Boell Foundation opinion.