Why International Climate Talks Matter to Georgia

In November of this year, a major climate conference – COP29 – will be held closer to Georgia than ever before: in Baku, Azerbaijan. This event will bring together thousands of delegates from around the world, joined by hundreds of observers, to negotiate key aspects of global climate governance architecture with a focus on the future of global climate finance. The key issue is how individual countries should contribute to the 2015 Paris Agreement’s goal to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and pursue efforts “to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” by the end of this century1.

 As a country that is increasingly suffering from the negative effects of the climate crisis, such as floods, landslides and forest fires2,  and as an important transit country for oil and gas from Central Asia and the South Caucasus to Europe, Georgia seemingly has a lot at stake in these negotiations. Decisions made at COP29 could impact the country’s access to international climate finance, the conditions for renewable energy development, and the broader geopolitical landscape, especially as climate action becomes increasingly tied to trade, investment, and regional cooperation. Thus, they could have direct implications for Georgia’s economic and political future.

Despite this, international debates on the climate crisis often fail to resonate with the Georgian public, the media, and the political elite. A 2020 UNDP study, What Does the Georgian Population Think About Climate Change?, found that nearly 98% of Georgians are aware of climate change, with around 91% recognizing it as a real threat to humanity3.  However, when compared to other pressing concerns – such as unemployment, poverty, rising living costs, Russian occupation, and low quality of education – environmental and climate issues rarely rank among the top 10 or even 15 priorities4.  This disconnect is likely driven by a lack of understanding of the broader socio-political and economic impacts of the climate crisis and the urgent need for climate action. Furthermore, studies show that media outlets often regard climate coverage as an “unserious” topic5,  and politicians rarely, almost never, engage in debates on environmental or climate-related issues6. 

For these reasons, conversations about the climate crisis in Georgia are usually confined to a small group of policymakers, ministry employees, project staff from international donors, and a few environmental organisations. These discussions often focus on technical and bureaucratic details, such as specific action plans or legislative changes, which means they remain disconnected from broader, more nuanced debates on climate justice – a concept that examines the social, economic, and political dimensions of climate action, including equity and accountability in international funding allocation, and the disproportionate impact of the climate crisis on vulnerable groups.
This disconnect creates a significant democratic gap, leaving the wider public excluded from crucial decision-making processes and hindering more inclusive, transparent approaches to both state and international climate responses. As a first step to addressing this gap, this article explores the most pressing global debates on climate justice and their relevance to Georgia’s socio-political context.

Where does Georgia stand at the international climate talks

Georgia, as a signatory to the Paris Agreement, is committed to the global effort to combat climate change through its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The Paris Agreement promotes a shared framework where all nations contribute based on their national circumstances and capabilities, encouraging “the highest possible ambition.” However, it also acknowledges the distinction between “developed” and “developing” countries, reaffirming the responsibility of developed nations to support developing countries with financial assistance, technology transfer, and capacity building.

As a developing country, Georgia is thus eligible to receive financial and technological support from developed countries to aid its efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation) and adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change. This reflects the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which acknowledges that, while all countries have a duty to address climate change, developed nations should take the lead due to their historical emissions and greater capabilities. This is closely tied to the understanding that, while wealthier countries in the Global North bear the primary responsibility for most emissions in the past, it is the poorer nations and communities, mainly in the Global South, which have contributed least to the climate crisis but are now facing its harshest impacts with limited resources to address them.
In this context, countries like Georgia are expected to contribute their “fair share” to global climate action in proportion to their responsibility for causing climate change and their capability to address it. Nevertheless, there is a general expectation that developing countries with more ambitious climate plans will receive more international financial support for implementing them.

What to expect from Baku

It is anticipated that this year’s COP in Baku will see important discussions on topics that could be of great political significance for Georgia. The conference’s emphasis on climate finance, dubbed the “Climate Finance COP”, will be particularly crucial. Climate finance broadly refers to “local, national or transnational financing – drawn from public, private and alternative sources of financing – that seeks to support mitigation and adaptation actions that will address climate change7.”  In global climate policy debates, climate finance provided by wealthier nations is seen as a crucial enabler of climate action in poorer countries.8

At the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit (COP15), developed countries committed to mobilising US$100 billion annually by 2020 to support the needs of developing countries. However, progress toward this target has been slow, and some estimates suggest it was only achieved in 20229. Despite this, the funding mechanisms have faced significant criticism for relying heavily on loans, which risk increasing the debt burden of developing nations10.  At COP29, discussions on climate finance will focus on the design of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), which aims to establish a new financial target to support developing countries in their climate efforts beyond 2025. In Baku, a key issue will be how climate finance can better reflect the evolving needs and priorities of countries grappling with the increasing impacts of climate change, persistent poverty, and rising debt11. 

Energy transition will be another key focus, with discussions likely to centre on strategies for phasing out fossil fuels and transitioning to renewable energy sources. Given the strategic and political weight of these issues, energy considerations extend far beyond the technicalities of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. They intersect with broader socio-political, economic, and geopolitical questions that will be central to the high-level climate negotiations in Baku.

The key question remains: Why do international climate talks matter to Georgia?

Georgia’s climate finance flows

To support their national climate actions, developing countries like Georgia can theoretically access climate finance from a variety of sources12.  These include grants from climate funds such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Green Climate Fund (GCF), Adaptation Fund (AF) and the upcoming Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), as well as market-based and concessional loans from global financial institutions like the World Bank. However, a critical concern is that only around one-quarter of global climate finance is currently provided as grants, with the majority coming in the form of loans13. 

According to OECD data on climate-related development finance provided to Georgia between 2008 and 2021, only 21% of total funding came in the form of grants, while 79% came as loans, with the remaining 1% from equity and shares in collective investment vehicles14.  A significant portion of these loans was provided by international financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and European Investment Bank (EIB), along with countries like Germany, France, and EU institutions. The biggest share of these loans was directed towards the energy sector. Private donors, including the Grameen Crédit Agricole Foundation and the Hewlett Foundation, also played a notable role as lenders to Georgia, particularly in banking and financial services.

It is noteworthy that in Georgia, there is a clear tendency to direct green financing in the energy sector towards the development of hydropower plants. Hydropower has attracted significant interest from both domestic and foreign private investors due to a favourable policy environment and the growing experience of local banks with “green credit” – a scheme backed by international financial institutions to finance these projects15.  Moreover, development partners such as the EBRD and the ADB have also supported such investments. Several high-impact hydropower projects are currently under construction, funded with their assistance.16 

In the debates on international climate justice, loan-based climate finance carries significant criticism. Such approach effectively forces developing countries like Georgia to bear the financial costs of climate action, even though they contribute relatively little to the climate crisis. The loan-dominated approach to climate finance can also be seen as contradicting the UNFCCC’s principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” For this reason, developing country representatives in global climate negotiations consistently call for a shift towards more grant-based finance to avoid exacerbating debt challenges in nations already struggling with debt sustainability.
Yet, it can be argued that whilst loans do increase debt, they can also enable larger-scale investments that might not be possible with grants alone. In this context, at the very least, donors must ensure that lending terms are fair and transparent, which can be difficult in countries like Georgia, where public debates on the climate crisis are limited. A lack of public accountability increases the chances of irresponsible borrowing and lending, which might mean that climate-related loans are not benefiting the broader public and the environment and instead serve the narrow interests of their international and domestic financiers17. 

Critical gaps: from adaptation to mitigation

Globally, the allocation of climate finance between climate adaptation and mitigation remains greatly unbalanced. The analysis from the Climate Policy Initiative shows that despite a significant increase in overall climate finance in recent years, funding for adaptation is declining as a share of the total18.  Adaptation finance made up only 7% of total climate financing in 2019–2020, which dropped to 5% in 2021–2022. This imbalance poses a significant climate justice concern, as it reflects a failure by wealthier nations to allocate sufficient resources for adaptation efforts. As a result, the countries and communities least responsible for climate change – largely in the Global South – are left without the means to adequately cope with its increasingly severe impacts. The UNDP’s 2023 Adaptation Gap Report found that the adaptation finance needs of developing countries are 10-18 times greater than current international public finance flows19.The underfunding of adaptation efforts exacerbates vulnerabilities, which can further perpetuate global inequalities.

The absence of detailed data on the breakdown between mitigation and adaptation finance in Georgia makes it difficult to determine the exact allocation of climate finance between these two critical areas. However, the country’s Fourth National Communication to the UNFCCC states that “[s]ince 2013, the quantity and price of projects implemented in Georgia in the field of climate change mitigation have been higher than in adaptation. Besides, it is clear that financial assistance in mitigation projects outweighs the technical assistance and capacity building assistance, while that in adaptation and pervasive projects is relatively smaller.”20

Some other indicators also shed light on the situation. A 2022 UNDP report shows that between 2010 and 2019, the main sectors receiving bilateral climate finance in Georgia were energy infrastructure (45%), water resources (17%), rural development (12%), and agriculture (7%)21.The emphasis on energy infrastructure suggests that a significant portion of this funding is directed towards mitigation efforts, as energy projects typically focus on reducing emissions. The same report highlights a notable gap in understanding the financial investment needed to meet Georgia’s adaptation targets, which hinders efforts to integrate adaptation measures into the state budget and could limit access to appropriate funds.

In this context, it is noteworthy that Georgia still lacks a National Adaptation Plan (NAP). In recent years, international donors have provided significant support to state institutions for climate policy development. This includes the Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan22 (adopted in 2021 with support from the German government) and the Long-term Low Emission Development Strategy (adopted in 2023 with assistance from the EU and UNDP)23. Yet these initiatives focus on mitigation. In 2020, the Georgian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture submitted a proposal to the GCF to finance readiness activities aimed at advancing the NAP process24. While the proposal was approved, little progress has been made in this area over the past few years. It can be argued that the absence of a proactive approach to adaptation financing from donors makes it difficult for the state institutions to prioritise this critical issue, leaving the country without a solid framework for addressing its growing adaptation needs.

Georgia’s Fourth National Communication to the UNFCCC identifies a significant gap in the country’s adaptation infrastructure. For example, one of the biggest challenges for Georgia is the lack of a unified, coordinated system for natural disaster risk identification, early warning and response. The importance of such systems cannot be overestimated, especially considering that the risk of natural disasters increases with climate change.

The deadly landslide in Shovi in 2023 is one of the most recent examples of the kind of disaster that could potentially be mitigated by better preparedness and response mechanisms.The Shovi tragedy sparked a major national debate in which state institutions and the government were heavily criticised for their mismanagement of preparedness and response25.  As climate change continues to exacerbate these risks, Georgia’s need for access to adequate climate finance for adaptation purposes becomes increasingly urgent. However, with already limited climate finance for adaptation globally, countries like Georgia are effectively having to compete with small island states and least developed countries that face potentially more pressing challenges.

Georgia remains heavily dependent on international donors for both funding and capacity-building in climate-related policy, regulatory development, and institutional strengthening. This reliance is evident in the absence of a coherent national climate change policy framework, where climate considerations are not integrated into broader state policies, such as Georgia’s Economic Development Strategy “Economy 2030,” despite clear thematic links26. The donor-driven approach often creates silos, isolating climate change from wider policy discussions in the country. At the same time, the majority of climate and environmental civil society organisations are sustained by foreign funding, which limits degree of domestic ownership over climate policymaking.

In this already challenging context, recent political developments have exposed Georgia to additional risks. The controversial foreign agent law, adopted by the Parliament in May 2024, labels any civil society or media organization receiving at least 20% of its funding from abroad as “organisations carrying out the interests of a foreign power.” Criticised for its likeness to the similar Russian law from 2012, this legislation has strained relations between the Georgian government and its Western partners. Following this, the EU and the US have halted funding for certain projects, citing concerns that the country's authorities had shifted away from European integration. Most recently, the EU has announced the suspension of over €120 million in aid to Georgia27. 

Following contested election results, which indicated that the ruling Georgian Dream party secured 53.9% of the vote amidst reports of irregularities and voter intimidation, the European Commission stated it will not recommend opening EU membership talks with Georgia unless the country changes course28. Ultimately, it falls to the Government of Georgia to curb its growing authoritarian tendencies, ensure a thorough investigation into allegations of election fraud, and reverse its increasingly anti-Western trajectory to secure a path forward. If the relations between Georgia and the West remain strained or deteriorate further, a further decrease in funding could reduce the country’s already limited support for climate preparedness.

(Geo)politics of international climate action

Given that Georgia’s climate finance is predominantly loan-based and directed towards energy sector mitigation efforts, it is essential to consider another key issue in global climate justice debates: the concept of a just energy transition. A just energy transition broadly means that the shift from fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas to renewable energy sources like wind and solar is conducted in a way that leaves no one behind29.  In other words, the transition should not further marginalise already vulnerable communities but instead offer them opportunities to benefit from the shift to cleaner energy sources.

Georgia occupies a crucial position as a transit hub, connecting Central Asia and the South Caucasus to Europe, particularly through its international road and pipeline infrastructure30.This strategic role has gained even greater importance following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, positioning Georgia as a critical alternative trade route that could bolster Europe’s energy security and enhance economic resilience across the region31. Georgia has also invested in its role within China’s Belt and Road Initiative32.  In May 2024, the Georgian Minister of Economy even announced that a Chinese consortium will build a strategic deep-sea port in Anaklia33,  highlighting Georgia’s potential as a vital link between Europe and China34.

Currently, three of Georgia’s key strategic trading partners, the EU, the US and China, are committed to the so-called net-zero targets35, meaning they aim to balance the greenhouse gases they emit with the removal of emissions from the atmosphere. In this context, the demand for clean energy will likely increase, particularly in the EU. This shows that while Georgia’s strategic trade routes and infrastructure play a vital role in the country’s geopolitical positioning, the country must also navigate the emerging global climate policy landscape with long-term vision in mind.

Interestingly, while Georgian political debates on the potential geopolitical implications of global climate action remain largely void, or climate media coverage is seen as “unserious,” it seems like the Georgian government has been quietly positioning itself to capitalize on Europe’s growing demand for cleaner energy. One example is the Georgian government’s focus on maximising the use of rivers for hydropower generation. The government’s plans not only aim to meet domestic demand and enhance energy security but also to produce excess energy for export to the EU36. The Black Sea Submarine Cable Project, for instance, is intended to provide the EU with an alternative, cleaner energy source37.  The World Bank has recently approved $35 Million investment for its preparatory activities.38 

The growing demand for cleaner energy in the EU arguably presents opportunities for Georgia. Critically, however, it raises significant challenges. Chief among these is the need to ensure climate justice in the planning and execution of large-scale renewable energy infrastructure, so that the energy transition is just and delivers benefits primarily to the country and its population. Without careful consideration, there is a high risk that the transition could disproportionately benefit wealthier European nations or a select few domestic investors, leaving broader social and economic benefits unrealized for the Georgian population.

In Georgia, this is not a hypothetical scenario. Hydropower remains a highly contentious issue due to the strong local opposition to large-scale projects. As these plans are negotiated between donors and Georgian state representatives at the highest political level, the key issues that have sparked local protests against hydropower – such as environmental damage and socio-economic injustices – remain largely unaddressed. In fact, some observers even believe that the state has increasingly reassured investors that local protests would no longer hinder these projects’ implementation39. 

Developing renewable energy is essential for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. However, Georgia must first define what a just energy transition means for the country. This requires engaging in serious public and political dialogue, a challenge given that climate change discussions are largely absent from the public eye and political agendas. Without a clear vision of a just transition, Georgia risks deepening existing inequalities rather than addressing them through the clean energy shift.

Georgia must pay attention to global climate debates

This analysis highlights the significant stakes for Georgia at the upcoming international climate talks in Baku in November 2024. Active participation in the global dialogue on climate justice is essential; without it, Georgia will have limited opportunities to advocate for favourable policy decisions at the UNFCCC level. This lack of engagement risks leaving the country and its population behind in the critical transition toward a sustainable future. Beyond Georgia, however, the article brings attention to the challenges faced by many donor-dependent countries as they navigate economic, social, political, and geopolitical pressures while falling short in key global dialogues. Without a democratic, bottom-up approach to global climate governance, achieving accountable and transparent climate action will be significantly hindered.
 

The Content of the article is the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Heinrich Boell Foundation Tbilisi Office - South Caucasus Region