A wedding party held in Tbilisi recently took on symbolic overtones thanks to the efforts by the government and media. The bride was Abkhaz and the bridegroom was Georgian. The authors of this impressive mystery decided that the couple was an exceedingly good embodiment of unity and the pathos and sense of the restoration of territorial integrity. At any rate, those who watched the report on this wedding party on Rustavi-2 must have received precisely such an impression. The happy couple have already been given a flat in Tbilisi and time on the air.
The report, which was Soviet-type in style and substance, is a very naive attempt of resolving Georgia's problems through administrative and televised methods, which seem to be supported by many in Tbilisi albeit without any realistic grounds.
I strongly doubt that this kind of promotion of a wedding party can give any positive momentum to prospects of reconciliation between Georgia and Abkhazia. However, this is not the only problem.
There are many other strange sides in this strange story. The apartment, which became part of the authorities' "demonstrative charity", cannot serve as a successful example of resolving refugees' housing problems. Moreover, I think that many of them would feel insulted by the fact that the government found it so easy to allocate precious square metres for primitive propaganda. One Georgian refugee even sewed up his mouth previously to express his protest and demand an apartment, but failed to receive it. It seems that they prefer to present a picture of success rather than conduct aggressive propaganda. Georgia's real successes (which cannot be denied) are rendered absolute and failures are persistently hushed up. For example, the ideal structure of the Georgian police is a means for not only combating corruption and ensuring efficient work of the law enforcement agencies, but also for taking other measures starting with the dispersal of demonstrations or putting pressure on businesses and ending with tapping telephone conversations of "reasonably suspicious" citizens.
Such use of the media and administrative resources is not at all a unique Georgian phenomenon. The same is happening in Abkhazia, but specific features are little different. Rosneft's petrol stations have become a new symbol of the republic as the evidence supposed to demonstrate this country's economic revival under way with the assistance of the elder brother.
This is indeed what can be seen on the surface, but there is another in-depth sophisticated idea: by demonstrating signs of the Russian oil company, the leaders of the republic express their self-satisfaction. They are now members of the elite Russian club involved in the criminal distribution of resources.
In the meantime, Abkhazia's real symbols, which the media and administrative resources are diligently trying to conceal, are quite different. We can regard as true symbols of today's Abkhazia, for example, confiscation of property; primitive corruption, which is so open and naive that can better be described as swindling; a weak judiciary system; and colonialist agreements with the powerful neighbour.
However, the Abkhaz propaganda differs from Georgian in that it is not aggressive. It rarely praises successes achieved in the Abkhaz paradise and is rather oriented on concealing dark sides of life.
Rosneft's new petrol stations have become a new symbol of the republic as the evidence supposed to demonstrate this country's economic revival under way with the assistance of the elder brother.
The terminology used in the article belongs to the author and not “Liberali”.
The article is prepared with support of Heinrich Boell Foundation. The publication statements and ideas do not necessarily express the Heinrich Boell Foundation opinion.