The following text was published in the Netgazeti online publication on 9 December 2015 as part of the Heinrich Boell Foundation's South Caucasus Regional Office's "South Caucasus News" partner project.
Georgia is now very close to the prospect of visa-free travel with Europe. In late November, when Italy ratified the Georgia-EU Association Agreement, some Georgians issued calls in social media like: "Abkhaz and Ossetian brothers and sisters, we're waiting for you". Some people likely thought that the better Georgia's "Euro-prospects", the more the Abkhaz will want to join Georgia. Much is likely to be written about this. I will confine myself to following logic based on my own observations and based on the specific attributes of these two attempts to actually build their own state and seek out the prospects that come along with that.
The question may be put as follows: Is it possible that simplified travel to and from Europe and step-by-step integration with it can help to create a consensus in Abkhaz society that will make it possible for us Georgians to live in a single state with them?
While I am already convinced that the answer to this question is negative, I still think it important that this issue not be discussed in statics. Our path towards Europe can not be single, but only one of several factors that could change public opinion, at least partially, in Abkhazia.
A) It must be taken into account that approximately one third of Abkhazia's population is neither ethnically Georgian nor ethnically Abkhaz. This is the electorate that is most naturally tied to the Russian orbit. In this discussion we definitely must allow for the notion that at some point both Georgians and Abkhaz could stand to benefit greatly from Gali Georgians and ethnic Abkhaz arriving at a common idea and developing a common vision for the future. The Georgian government should work to move the Gali Georgians closer to the Abkhaz vision rather than turning these people into a Georgian fifth column in Abkhazia. But better to speak about this at another time.
B) If we say that pro-Russian sentiments in Georgia have been growing recently, it will be logical to examine the fact that such sentiment exists among some Abkhaz as well. Pro-Russian people, both in Georgia and Abkhazia, have many things in common: lack of knowledge about Western values, reverence for power and, most importantly, material concerns: the Spongers. Seems that this is a common category: For both spongers, here and there, Russia is a a guaranteed source of financial inflows, and of course, chance at employment. For the Abkhaz, there is the additional factor that the EU is associated with Georgian interests while the Russian orbit is a shield against possible Georgian aggression and against the mass return of displaced Georgians - which is something the Abkhaz fear just as much as losing their unrecognized independence. They see things like this: the Georgians who were forced to settle in Abkhazia in the late 19th century and during the Beria period (1930s-1950s) robbed the Abkhaz of even the theoretical opportunity to express their own will. It should be said here that some Abkhaz deem it acceptable for those Georgians to return who share their values.
C) The great losses sustained by the Abkhaz provide an argument against striving to join the EU as part of the Georgian state. Whoever is interested in the subject knows that the war of 1992-93 was on the whole much more traumatic for Abkhaz society than for Georgians, as given their small numbers practically every family lost at least one member. The list of relatives, friends and acquaintances who’ve lost their lives in this war, will be too long for any Abkhaz. The Abkhaz believe that this sacrifice obliges them to maintain what they achieved at such a cost. However, questions may arise if the Russian Federation's intentions become so clear that they overshadow the Georgian threat. So far the Abkhaz quest for independence resembles the course of a ship at the mercy of fate as it tries to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis.
Some Georgians more or less engaged in Abkhaz-Georgian peacekeeping process shared the same impression during the years that that the Abkhaz, while not saying so openly, were waiting for the Georgian state to offer them the most acceptable status and conditions. An excellent example of this - and accordingly of the chance that the Georgians let slip away - was Sergey Shamba's visit to Tbilisi in 2006. Now it is absolutely clear that the Georgian side was always late in responding to a certain readiness on the part of the Abkhaz and each time ended up longing for the previous reality.
After Putin recognized Abkhazia in 2008, the reality changed. The Abkhaz will no longer consider the things they themselves had been proposing. It can once again be said here that no single reality can be discussed in statics. It is theoretically possible to imagine that the Russian government's tendency towards increasing impudence could so change Abkhaz public opinion - at least regarding assessments of the current reality - that we could see a return to the pre-2008 picture. And here is where we come to the main issue. What lessons have we learned from the experience of those years? Have we made conclusions? Did we bother to change/ refine the action plan to offer, did we elaborate brand new ideas necessary for a return to the topic so that to feel confident, to be taken seriously by another party?
Things that could have been done include: a review of Georgia's and Abkhazia's separate and common histories; an analysis of the Beria period (both weigh on Georgian society like an undone homework ); the signing of a non-use of force agreement (authoritative nongovernmental organizations have conducted polls in Abkhazia that show that cooperation with the EU and Georgia would be possible if Georgia were to sign such an agreement (incidentally, such cooperation could include learning from Georgia's experience in fighting corruption and reforming the healthcare and education systems)); acknowledging that some of the displaced Georgians have already returned to Abkhazia (Gali District); and adopting a new vision on the role of the Gali Georgians - namely, instead of the attempts to turn them into a "fifth column” in Abkhazia, they should be seen as performing the role of cultural and identity bridge between the Georgians and Abkhazians, like the Kists between Georgians and Vaynakhs ( Chechens and Ingushs), this transforming the painful factor into asset, beneficial for each of the group, and for Gali locals in first place.
Perhaps the Georgians must show first as well that they have built a socially oriented state where unemployed people are not in danger of going without gas, electricity and food and where everything is being done to eliminate unemployment itself. Otherwise, waving around photos of renovated Batumi and Anaklia will not help Georgia make its case to the Abkhaz and free medical assistance is only seen as a manipulative manoeuvre of someone lying in wait.
Finally, alongside thinking over the 19th century expulsion of Abkhaz to the Middle East and the Beria period, the Abkhaz must see that the attemts to replace the IDs to Abkhazia is not a part of strategy to strengthen Georgian element or influence in Abkhazia. To demonstrate this intention, all efforts must be taken to strengthen Abkhaz ethnic element.
D) I for one wonder whether it is possible in the long term for the Georgian state to promote tourism and investment in Abkhazia among Europeans. I also wonder how such friendly actions would impact the investment environment in Georgia. Would such a peace-loving move not make our country more attractive to investors as a state committed to peace and therefore stability?
There might be people in Abkhazia who will make a rational (in Georgian point of view) choice and conclude that being with Georgia can provide better conditions than remaining in Russia's orbit. But where are the preconditions for these conditions?
It is totally clear that, despite its recognition, it is precisely Russia itself that is trying not ensure that Abkhazia has no prospects – to put it more bluntly, it is clear that Russia benefits from Abkhazia's isolation while the EU is calling on the Georgian side to take steps towards Abkhazia's de-isolation.
Yes, some Abkhaz are trying in vain to somehow reduce Russia's influence (a good example being the effort to establish an independent Orthodox Christian eparchy) and tie themselves to the Western world. There are young people who have been educated in the West and, after having experiencing Western values, only "put up" with the realities of the "Russian world" because they cannot see any other options.
One element of de-isolating the Abkhaz could be offering them travel documents that are acceptable both to them and to the Georgian side.
Years ago the Abkhaz were demanding UN passports but the Georgian side refused. So-called "neutral passports" are now unacceptable to the Abkhaz. There are other ways of handling such issues, for example citizens of Turkish North Cyprus can use their passports as travel documents. The Georgian side (in the abstract form of "Georgian experts", as the press calls them) believes that recognizing Abkhaz passports would be tantamount to recognizing Abkhazia. But clearly this is not the case.
Now let us look at what is happening in reality and what strategy the Georgian side is pursuing:
The Abkhaz found reasons to hope for de-isolation in the European Parliament's 2011 resolution. Abkhazia's foreign ministry said at the time: "Abkhazia, as a part of Europe, considers close cooperation with the European Union to be one of the priority directions of its foreign policy."
At that time the foreign ministry was headed by Maksim Ghvinjia, who would have been quite an asset even for the Georgian diplomatic corps: Ghvinjia pursued his studies first at Harvard and then at a university in Wales, where he focused on human rights law. He was clearly a Western-style diplomat.
In response to Abkhazia's welcoming of the resolution, a bastion of Georgian "patriotism" called the Experts Club published an article titled "The Abkhaz have registered as Europeans". This logic is interesting given that Georgia, which is much more influenced by Asia, claims to have ancient European roots. Ironically , while Georgians rally on Abkhazia's dependence on Russia, Abkhazians are desperately seeking the way out, some of them even asserting that the republic should refuse Russian assistance.
Abkhaz MP Leonid Chamagua said this year: "Some Abkhaz are left with the impression that Abkhazia is being subjected to open blackmail by unconscientious Russian officials."
Chamagua said that Russian financial aid was tied to unacceptable demands and that Russia is either not fulfilling its promises - including financial ones - or greatly underfulfilling them.
A member of the Abkhaz parliament's budget committee, Beslan Tsvinaria this year put forward a proposal that Abkhazia reject Russian financial assistance and fully activate its own resources. He and many Abkhaz harbour the justified grievance that the deployment of Russian military bases in Abkhaz territory should have its price and that therefore the Russian aid tranches - which are periodically frozen (as a form of punishment for insubordination) - should in fact not be viewed strictly as aid. In addition, Abkhazia has the means to boost its budget and live on its own means. Such Russian assistance degrades Abkhaz nation, Tsvinaria said. He went on to emphasize the need to support Abkhaz business. Indeed, Abkhaz businessmen are trying to establish contacts with foreign countries independently and in circumvention of Russian patronage.
It would seem clear that the Abkhaz need the help of the Georgian state to fulfil this aspiration to achieve maximum independence and at least move to the outer rings of the Russian orbit.
In spring 2014 a delegation of the Abkhaz Chamber of Commerce and Industry took part in a conference of the Potsdam Industrialists Club. Seems that (such was an impression while reading Georgian press) Abkhazia was represented at the conference without a defined status. In 2013 a group of German business people paid a visit to Abkhazia. The Abkhaz participation in the Potsdam conference was a reciprocal visit aimed at demonstrating the potential of their republic (an unrecognized republic is still a republic), including in the tourism sphere.
The rest we learn from the Georgian press. "As soon as our Foreign Ministry got involved and explain to the official authorities what they were dealing with and this issue was closed. I think that in this case they [Abkhaz] are spending money and energy in vain, as Abkhazia's tourist infrastructure is of no interest to Germans. I think they are toiling in vain," Georgian ruling coalition MP Gia Volski was quoted as saying.
"Our Foreign Ministry was compelled to tell the German embassy that if such contacts continue, they will not facilitate friendly relations between Germany and Georgia," analyst Soso Tsintsadze was quoted as saying.
Georgian experts are not only ,,informed” about the passport issue. Sometimes they threaten the leading countries of the European Union.
Such an episode occurred in September of this year in Italy, in the city of Bari, where an Abkhaz Chamber of Commerce delegation took part in the "Fiera del Levante" exhibition. The foreign minister promptly informed the Italian government that the Abkhaz had deceived their way into participating in the exhibition. Both sides have their own versions as to what happened next: The Georgian side says that the Abkhaz stand was removed from the exhibition while the Abkhaz maintain their contract was properly complied and the exhibition organizers did not change their mind after receiving the note.
The Georgian side is engaged in a real war of flags with Tengiz Tarba, mountain climber and diplomat (and excellent photographer - the author of the "Mountainous Abkhazia" project, which promotes extreme sport and eco-tourism in his homeland). He and several other Abkhaz mountain climbers had already planted the Abkhaz flag on Mt Elbrus and Mt Kilimanjaro by the time they got around to Aconcagua in Argentina. The short-term presence of the Abkhaz flag there (mountain climbers say that flags rarely remain on mountain peaks for long, likely because of wind or other natural factors) shook the foundations of Georgian statehood. This happened in January 2014.
The famous Swedish mountain climber Johan Nilson took part in the expedition alongside the Abkhaz. "Nilson will regret it," wrote Georgian mountain climber Gia Tortladze. "I will inform the whole world of travellers about this."
The Georgian state clearly has other enemies at home and abroad. No matter how many photos the Abkhaz flag appears in, or how many Abkhaz children dance in competitions under that flag, no one can damage our statehood as we Georgians do. Neither Abkhaz businessmen visiting Europe, nor Abkhaz children playing checkers in Mexico (we raised a stink about this too) can surpass us in that.
What if the hundred thousand or so Abkhaz scattered across the world by crude force see their flag on a mountain peaks and tell the rest of the world that, in spite of everything, they still exist, they have a wonderful, good-looking young generation - and what if the Georgian state did not hinder them in this? Where would the harm be in that? The question can be put another way: Would such a Georgia not be more attractive for them that - while not conceding its principles - supports them in wanting to remind the world of their existence, at least in areas not connected to politics?
I think the last positive experience in our common Georgian-Abkhaz history is coming at a time when many things have been resolved through conciliatory gestures made to each other. Our history knows the battles avoided and unfought due to such gestures from both side.
Of course, practically any Georgian government will avoid straying from the beaten path until the homework assignment described above is not done. Georgia simply cannot be considered a reliable party until it does this homework.
Now many Abkhaz are asking why the Georgian state is playing the Russian game, why it is thoughtlessly pushing Abkhazia to Russia.
At this point, turning the situation around requires consensus in Georgian society and in Abkhaz society so that the sides can have more common points of interest to start from. We need to start with this reality and not with the unceasing and annoying series of mutual accusations which have pushed many useful people away from the process. Georgian society must change first, and then we can see how the Abkhaz society changes. Otherwise, that which we lost will completely disappear from the maps and then from reality. This is what we must get our heads around.
Disclaimer: This paper is prepared within the framework of the South Caucasus Regional Office of the Heinrich Boell Foundation (HBF SC) Web Dossier project. The views, opinions and statements expressed by the author are hers alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the HBF SC.