Over the past few decades, the crisis of democracy, deepening inequality, and the rise of the far-right have been cited as major global challenges to the international order. The crisis of democracy usually refers to the threats facing liberal democracies in many Western countries. The rise of illiberal forces in major Western states — a trend no longer limited to unstable or transitional democracies — has dampened the optimism following the waves of democratization after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which extended through the 1990s and early 2000s. A peculiar characteristic of this illiberal turn is that the political forces behind it claim democratic support and legitimacy. One could argue that the so-called crisis of democracy is, in fact, a crisis of liberalism — a collection of threats to liberalism that originate in democracy, albeit understood in a narrow, majoritarian, and exclusive frame. Leftist thinkers have written about the crisis of liberal democracy since the 1980s, but these discussions were inflected very differently.1 They emphasized the neoliberal erosion of Western welfare states, closely linked with the rise of neoconservatism. In this critique, the crisis is one of democracy, which comes under pressure from a liberalism that places fundamental social institutions beyond democratic control. Liberal politics redefined democracy in ways that made elite power unquestionable and practically unchallengeable, a state of politics often described as post-democratic. Another thread in the contemporary critique of liberal democracy — focusing on the managerialization of politics and the post-political condition — also has its roots in this reading of contemporary history.
This shows that the theorization of the tension between democracy and liberalism has a long and varied history. Different ideologies perceive this tension in contrasting terms. From a leftist perspective, a key aspect of this tension is the tendency of economic liberalism to create socio-economic inequality, which in turn makes political equality impossible to achieve — a vicious cycle exacerbated by the unequal distribution of power. The globalization of financialized capitalism reduces the power of individual states, which often must satisfy the interests of multinational corporations over those of their own citizens. Simultaneously, the oligarchization of political elites and the convergence of political and economic classes dictate national economic policies, neglecting public interests and reducing public participation and democratic oversight in political decision-making.
The concept of sovereignty is another important corollary of the discussions — both on the left and the right — around the crisis of democracy. Right wing rhetoric frequently evokes national sovereignty and mobilises critical concepts similar to decolonisation to promote its antiegalitarian agenda. The Georgian government also engages this tactic in its efforts to consolidate power. The left sees the origin of the crisis in inequality and social and economic injustice, which precipitates a crisis of popular sovereignty. For those on the left, popular sovereignty is built on the foundation of equality and the need for its expansion, to include all parts of the society and to ensure that the public can exert its control over all determinants of its welfare, including the economy.
Deepening economic inequality, diminishing popular sovereignty, and the erosion of fundamental human rights characterize the current crisis of liberal democracy. Authoritarian regimes base their campaigns to reduce the influence of international institutions and monopolize power on national, not popular, sovereignty. The concept of national sovereignty relies on a nationalist definition of the populace that excludes non-dominant groups and constructs a vision of homogenous popular unity. According to this approach, a strong leader represents the people, and any opposition to one implies opposition to the other. Since the 2000s, the concept of sovereign democracy has become popular in Russia. This concept has proved attractive both to authoritarian regimes and to other actors in the Global South due to its vague evocation of sovereignty. Sovereign democracy has provided Russia with an ideological framework for its wars of conquest and antidemocratic campaigns that form its imperialist politics. Putin’s sovereign democracy resists both popular pressure from below and international pressure from above, while pursuing a dangerous political and economic agenda that leaves little space for egalitarian movements to influence policy and protect marginalized groups, including women, LGBTQ+ communities, and religious and ethnic minorities.
Concepts of political and economic sovereignty are undoubtedly effective instruments for authoritarian regimes seeking to consolidate power. Evoking the mission of strengthening sovereignty lends certain domestic legitimacy to such governments, regardless of their actual definition of sovereignty. In the Global South, a striving toward autonomy in local policy and decision making adds legitimacy to the criticism of powerful states and international organisations. But in reality, authoritarian governments instrumentalize the concept of sovereignty and take advantage of its cover to seek new geopolitical alliances with other authoritarian states. Consequently, far from being liberated from the influence of powerful states and international organisations, they end up being subjected to other imperialist and authoritarian actors, while the goal of achieving political sovereignty remains unfulfilled. In the circumstances described above, economic sovereignty remains just as elusive — when economic sovereignty becomes a populist gimmick devoid of a genuine vision of economic transformation and associated reforms, geopolitical realignment merely diversifies the streams of financialised capital, while the substance of economic policy remains unchanged.Georgia provides clear examples of such tendencies. The Georgian government is vocal in propagating the discourse of economic sovereignty but leaves its policy of development — fueled by large-scale infrastructural investments — unaddressed. The government remains committed to attracting private capital, insuring it against political, fiscal, and market risks. It continues to support even those investment projects that have dubious social or public merit. Such projects pose significant social, environmental, and economic risks for local communities and the economy as a whole. This vision of development might be supported by international organizations and financial institutions, but the Georgian government is not planning to free itself from such pressures to pursue an alternative policy centered on the public interest. Instead, it is only attempting to diversify investment streams for infrastructural projects.
Diversifying capital flows might enable the government to exercise more autonomy in foreign relations. However, such a policy could also facilitate the consolidation of its power base and the imposition of authoritarian rule domestically. Although Western financial institutions' record in the Global South is poor, their approach pushes governments toward respecting democracy, the rule of law, and environmental standards. China creates no such pressure, making alliance with it more attractive to authoritarian regimes and more pernicious for their societies.