The 2024 Elections in Georgia: descent into hegemonic authoritarianism

The ruling Georgian Dream party (GD) ostensibly won Georgia’s parliamentary elections, which took place on 26 October 2024, by a large margin. According to the preliminary results, the GD received 53.93 per cent of the vote, while the four pro-Western opposition parties stood at 37.79 per cent combined. The results reveal a large – and in its magnitude, new – gap between urban and rural polling stations: whereas the Georgian Dream failed to gain an absolute majority of votes in the capital Tbilisi and cities of Batumi, Kutaisi and Rustavi, in the district of Tsalenjikha, and in in the diaspora,[1] it received between a staggering 70 and 90 per cent of the vote in some of the minority-populated and mountainous Georgian regions. Turnout, preliminarily standing at 58.94 per cent, was higher than in the 2020 and 2016 parliamentary elections but lower than in the 2012 elections that brought the Georgian Dream to power. 

The stakes were very high, and the opposition and most of Georgia’s pro-democratic and pro-European civil society considered and branded the election as a referendum about Georgia’s European integration. How did the Georgian Dream tilt the electoral field in its favour despite moving away from the European Union while, according to polls, around 80 per cent of the population favour the country’s EU integration? What implications could the results have for Georgia’s democracy and its relationship with the EU, and what can we expect next?

Widespread manipulation

According to local and international election observers, the elections were marred by various irregularities. In its interim report, published on 11 October, the OSCE/ODIHR had already noted an ‘entrenched political polarization, continued political tension, opposition distrust in state institutions and concerns about protection of the right to association and expression’. Particularly worrying were doubts about the impartiality of the election administration and evidence of misuse of administrative resources and pressure on voters, also highlighted by local observers such as Transparency International and ISFED. Moreover, the broader political context needs to be considered: the GD’s adoption of stigmatizing “foreign agent” and anti-queer laws, as well as its anti-Western rhetoric, negatively affected civic space in the country, which is critical, especially ahead of contested elections. In addition, there was a stark disparity between the ruling party’s financial resources and those of the opposition. According to Transparency International Georgia, individuals who donated to the ruling party often owned companies that were granted state tenders or other forms of support. 

The OSCE’s preliminary assessment,[2] published a day after the vote, assessed the campaign as ‘competitive but subdued, and contestants could generally campaign freely, but reports of intimidation, coercion and pressure on voters persisted, especially on public sector employees and the economically vulnerable, raising concerns about the ability of some voters to freely form their opinions and cast their vote without fear’. It also criticized ‘frequent compromises in vote secrecy and several procedural inconsistencies’. Concerns about vote secrecy were multiplied by the introduction of digital verification and ballot counting machines, which, coupled with disinformation, led some voters to believe their vote would not remain secret. Local election observation missions, who were exceptionally mobilized, came to an even more critical assessment. Among others, ISFED observed voter bribery at 13 per cent of polling stations it observed, and voter tracking at almost every third polling station. An election statistics expert, mapping turnout and election results per polling station in a scatterplot, suggested that the strong support for the Georgian Dream in rural areas is likely explained by manipulation, such as the organized transport of voters (observed by ISFED at 19 percent of polling stations).

Those irregularities and the unlevel playing field ahead of the elections undoubtedly benefited the ruling party. The four opposition coalitions that nevertheless crossed the threshold – Coalition for Change, Unity to Save Georgia, Strong Georgia and For Georgia – as well as president of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili, all called the elections illegitimate. A first major protest took place on 28 October.

The Georgian Dream’s political strategy

Regardless of pressure and intimidation, it cannot be denied that the Georgian Dream’s political strategy has certainly resonated with many voters. The party built its campaign on the classical illiberal playbook on the one hand, coupled with disinformation about Georgia’s EU enlargement process, the instrumentalization of fears of Russia and promises of the restoration of territorial integrity on the other hand. 

The Georgian Dream, which came to power in 2012 as a politically diverse party and coalition, has shed its liberal-progressive elements over the past few years and increasingly consolidated itself as an illiberal, right-wing political player. Notably, it campaigned with the promise of a constitutional change to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman as early as the 2016 parliamentary elections, even though same-sex marriage was never legal and not on the agenda. More recently, it has begun to follow the Russian-Hungarian playbook comprehensively and strategically by, among others, adopting so-called “foreign agent” legislation and anti-queer legislation, both of which have been heavily criticized by independent bodies such as the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. When the GD launched its election campaign in July, Bidzina Ivanishvili, oligarch and mastermind behind the Georgian Dream, vowed to put an end to ‘liberal fascism’ should the party receive a two-thirds majority. In a TV appearance in October, Ivanishvili stated that ‘enemies of the people and enemies of the country must be banned’ and ‘everyone who is positive and loves the country will find a place with us [the GD]’. He also described the opposition as ‘people without a homeland’. Moreover, he painted a dystopian image of the West where, allegedly, orgies happen on the streets and people are pushed into gender dysphoria. 

Next to anti-gender, anti-Western and hyper-polarizing politics, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Georgian Dream has heavily propagated the conspiracy theory of a ‘global war party’ that allegedly seeks to drag Georgia into a war with Russia and open a ‘second front’. Large election campaign posters juxtaposed images from war-torn Ukraine with peaceful Georgia. What is more, the party not only presented itself as the only guarantor of peace in Georgia but also floated the (likely empty) promise of a restoration of territorial integrity under its rule.

Crucial to understand, however, is that the Georgian Dream, despite its anti-Western agenda and anti-European course, adopted the campaign motto ‘With Peace, Dignity, and Prosperity to Europe’. The party claims that Georgia will become a member of the European Union by 2030, despite numerous statements by EU and Member State officials that no progress can be made in EU integration unless the Georgian Dream revokes the ‘agent law’ and implements the nine steps defined by the European Commission last year. However, the polarized TV landscape, in which Georgian Dream voters tend to watch Georgian Dream–affiliated TV channels, made it easier for the GDto continue presenting itself as a pro-European party, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Lastly, the endorsement by the Church certainly also helped the party to win the elections.

By now, the Georgian Dream has become a hegemonic party: it dominates the parliament and has done so for an extended period of time; it has brought almost all public institutions under its control; and it is dismantling rights and freedoms in the country. The GD’s hegemonic nature will make it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to defeat the party in democratic elections and may turn the country into a hegemonic autocracy.[3] Georgia’s next elections are scheduled for autumn 2025, when the parties will compete in municipal and mayoral elections. The opposition could theoretically score a few victories, especially in Tbilisi and some of the larger cities. However, the Georgian Dream will go far to prevent opposition wins – probably even further than during the 2024 parliamentary elections. 

Opposition responsibility

It should be noted that Georgia lacks a developed multiparty system with established and institutionalized parties that compete along ideological lines, which can be explained by numerous structural issues, but also failures on the part of the opposition. For the 2024 parliamentary elections, opposition unity was particularly important, and it was at least partially achieved through extensive involvement by Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili. However, ahead of the elections, the opposition parties nevertheless failed to agree on a proposal for a joint prime ministerial candidate for the technical government that was foreseen by Zourabichvili’s charter. This may have further eroded public trust that the parties can a) find consensus after the elections and b) would truly propose a candidate that is not affiliated with the former, controversial ruling elites who were in power until 2012. 

In addition, while the four opposition party coalitions that crossed the threshold arguably did a decent job coming together and campaigning, given their lack of institutionalization, lower levels of funding and the unlevel playing field, they could have done more to reach out to voters in the regions and address social issues. Moreover, they struggled to respond to the Georgian Dream’s war vs peace narrative and to engage with potential fears among voters of further conflict with Russia in case the opposition wins. 

Illiberal-authoritarian bolstering 

Notably, the Georgian Dream has received extensive illiberal-authoritarian bolstering around the election, illustrative of the international politics of electoral manipulation conceptualized by academics such as Oisín Tansey. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, all of whom – except for neighbour Pashinyan – adhere to and promote a distinctly illiberal-authoritarian ideology, were first to congratulate the Georgian Dream.

Russian officials clearly endorsed the Georgian Dream ahead of the election (and not for the first time), warning of a ‘Maidan’ in Georgia during the foreign agent protests in June and repeatedly backing the Georgian Dream’s anti-Western discourse and actions with supportive statements. Two weeks before the election, Russia also further relaxed its visa requirements for Georgian citizens. 

The Georgian Dream, moreover, benefited from support from the Azerbaijani government, which is significant given that 6.3 per cent of the Georgian population are ethnic Azeris. Azerbaijan’s government news agency promoted Georgian Dream candidates, and in a polling station in ethnic Azeri–dominated Marneuli, which was won by the opposition in 2020, results had to be annulled due to aggressive ballot stuffing. In one viral video filmed on election day, an Azerbaijani MP claims that no violations are occurring while a voter takes a picture of her ballot in the background. Notably, Baku was one of the few cities abroad where the GD won overwhelmingly – with 410 out of 446 votes.[4]

On election day, the Georgian public broadcaster featured an interview with Fidesz MEP András László, in which he described an allegedly calm environment. On his X account, he claimed that ‘local NGO observers and official election staff all say that everything is very orderly’. Two days after the election, Viktor Orbán visited Tbilisi, seeking to provide further “European legitimacy” to the Georgian Dream. 

EU and US reactions, and implications for relations with the European Union 

In contrast, European Council President Charles Michel endorsed the criticism of the OSCE/ODIHR report, called for an investigation into the violations and announced that Georgia would be on the agenda of the next European Council meeting in, of all places, Budapest. Brussels and Washington had already begun to review their relationship with Tbilisi following the adoption of the foreign agent law. In July, the United States paused USD 95 million in financial assistance to Georgia; in September, it imposed financial and visa sanctions on Georgian officials and right-wing activists. The European Union froze Georgia’s EU accession process and, among others, withheld EUR 30 million in aid to the Georgian Ministry of Defense. Member States such as Germany and Denmark took further measures, equally withholding aid, loans and military assistance. The next Georgian Dream government will almost certainly not implement the EU’s nine priorities for Georgia’s EU integration in good faith, and its relationship with the EU will likely deteriorate further.

While the EU’s rhetoric has, at least since Georgia’s adoption of the foreign agent law, been mostly clear, it could have been politically stronger – if it wasn’t for Hungary and other illiberal EU Member States blocking stricter measures. The EU’s more critical stance also came late, falling victim to a more geopolitical stance, as well as the need to stand by Georgia’s civil society following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Georgia’s EU membership application. Now, Georgia risks becoming another country descending into autocracy while experiencing the globally diminishing ‘external cost of authoritarianism.’ Given its strategic location, Georgia has (some) non-Western options that promise short-term gains, including enhancing its relationship with China. 

Moreover, although granting a NATO Membership Action Plan to Georgia at NATO’s Bucharest summit in 2008 might not have prevented the ensuing Russo-Georgian war, the Georgian Dream has a point in saying that the country lacks Western security guarantees. Georgia’s vulnerable position could therefore justify a cautious stance towards Russia but not Georgian Dream’s illiberal, anti-democratic politics. Besides, the Georgian Dream has done little to nothing to enhance Georgia’s economic security and reduce trade with Russia – to the contrary, economic ties with Russia have flourished under its rule.

What’s next?

It is likely that Tbilisi will see further protests, although these will most likely only achieve their desired goal if hundreds of thousands of citizens can be mobilized over an extended period of time and across the entire country. Should this happen, a violent crackdown on the protesters can be expected; just before the elections, the Interior Minister proudly presented new riot police equipment. If major violence is used, the situation could easily get out of hand, with unforeseeable consequences. 

If the Georgian Dream stays in power, it will seek to enforce and potentially tighten both the foreign agent law and the anti-queer law, with grave consequences for Georgian civil society, the media and overall civic space. While the party has not gained the constitutional majority it had sought to ban the political opposition, it could still launch systematic repression. The relationship with the EU would become more transactional, and aid provided for Georgia’s democratic and European transformation would – and should – decrease, which would also disperse hopes in civil society that the European integration process could be used to improve environmental and social standards in Georgia. As a whole, if the Georgian Dream stays in power for another four years or more, this will have serious repercussions for Georgian democracy and foreign alignment, most probably leading to a collective depression among Georgia’s active citizens and soaring emigration rates of students and high-skilled professionals.

In coordination with the US, the EU and its pro-democratic Member States, as well as Georgia’s president, opposition and civil society, should urgently enter into discussions on which measures can realistically be taken to save Georgia from descending into autocracy. The EU’s initial statement was rather cautious; it should now take a stronger stance while aiming not to alienate those who genuinely voted for the ruling party. Only a genuinely independent investigation into the allegations of violations would restore trust in the election process and outcome, and disperse the well-grounded scepticism. Hence, Georgia’s democratic partners may suggest helping with setting up a high-level, independent international fact-finding mission to scrutinize the allegations of violations. For this, dialogue with the ruling party and government would also be required. 

If the Georgian Dream stays in power, only one thing is certain: the EU must continue to support Georgian civil society to the best of its abilities; and if and when this is no longer possible within Georgia, the EU must be ready to ensure the survival of Georgia’s democratic initiatives and spirit abroad until there’s a new chance to establish a democratic, European Georgia. The door to the European Union must remain open for Georgia, and the EU must continue to proactively seek ways to support Georgia passing through it – we owe this to all Georgian democrats, who have for decades relentlessly fought for a European, better future for this fantastically beautiful, diverse and historically rich EU neighbouring country.