The protests that erupted in Iran in late December 2025 and the subsequent escalation of hostilities between Iran and the United States have rekindled discussions regarding a new military attack on Iran. The expansion of US naval presence in the Middle East, as well as the conflicting views of the parties negotiating Iran’s nuclear program, continue to pose a heightened risk of a military solution to the problem. What impact will these developments have on Armenia’s security and how might security risks be mitigated without compromising democratic principles? This article attempts to address these questions while introducing new dilemmas.
In June 2025, military operations conducted by Israel and the United States against Iran, in tandem with the imposition of new economic sanctions, created a volatile environment of concentrated internal and external pressure. Under such conditions, it was foreseen that any protest movement stemming from socio-economic grievances would rapidly evolve into an unpredictable crisis. Simultaneously, the external military threat and the tightening of economic blockade significantly limit the authorities’ capacity to contain internal dissent. Furthermore, the high death toll during the last waves of protests amplified the unpredictability of future domestic upheavals.
Protest movements have been an enduring feature of Iran’s modern history and a defining feature of its political and civic culture. Since its inception, the history of the Islamic Republic has been defined by internal contradictions and public demonstrations; the mandatory requirement to wear the hijab, enforced immediately following the revolution, impelled many women who felt betrayed to take to the streets. Subsequent decades saw periodic waves of large-scale unrest, such as the 1999 student movement and the Green Movement formed following the 2009 elections under the slogan “Where is my vote?” The latter underscored that the protesters were initially challenging the integrity of the electoral process rather than the legitimacy of the entire system. While the 2017-2019 protests were primarily socio-economic, they rapidly assumed a political character. By 2020, public discontent intensified following the downing of a Ukrainian passenger aircraft due to failings in government management and transparency. The most significant movement in recent years, sparked in 2022 by the death of Mahsa Amini under the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom,” explicitly synthesized demands for human dignity, liberty, and systemic change.
The demonstrations that began in late December 2025 were triggered by a sharp devaluation of the rial, though they unfolded against a much broader crisis. Iran had just concluded a 12-day war against Israel and the United States, suffering serious losses in its nuclear infrastructure, despite decades of diverting vast resources toward both that program and regional proxies in the “Axis of Resistance” at the expense of growing socio-economic problems within the country. This wave of protests was distinguished by its origin in the Tehran Grand Bazaar — a traditional bastion of the regime’s power — and its rapid diffusion across nearly all provinces, acquiring a notable degree of coordination, due in part to the influence of Reza Pahlavi. Despite numerous revolutionary indicators, including the advanced age of the Supreme Leader and a systemic crisis, no significant fragmentation within the ruling elite has emerged. Instead, the authorities’ draconian response — comprising internet blackouts, severe repression, and mass casualties — has effectively foreclosed the possibility of internal political compromise.
The spectre of further military escalation persists. Both Israel and the US claim that their strategic goals have not been fully achieved, specifically the complete neutralization of Iran's nuclear capabilities, the cessation of its ballistic missile program and the reversal of its regional influence. Furthermore, during the recent wave of protests, US President Trump’s “pledge” to the Iranian people that “help is on its way” once again elevated the prospect of military intervention within American and Israeli strategic circles. The US President publicly spoke about this scenario, while the US Navy carried out significant redeployments to its bases in the Middle East.
It seems unlikely that the political and economic foundations of a system under such extreme internal and external pressure will remain static. It is difficult to conceive that following the killing and suppression of thousands of protesters, the slogans “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” will no longer be accompanied by cries of “Death to the dictator,” regardless of the regime’s attempts to dismiss dissenters as puppets and lackeys of external forces. In these circumstances, several scenarios emerge.
Deal with the Existing Regime
Despite the adversarial rhetoric between the US and Iran, the possibility of a new accord — one encompassing not only nuclear and missile programs, and regional policy, but also internal political reforms — remains a viable option.
In this regard, US and Israeli interests diverge. While for Israel — and specifically Prime Minister Netanyahu — regime change in Iran and a large-scale war against Iran have been a decades-long strategic fixation, for the United States, such a shift is a potential instrument of policy rather than an end in itself. The US primary objective is to decouple Iran from the anti-Western, pro-Chinese axis and include it among its allies in the Middle East. Although President Trump frequently invokes the theme of regime change in Iran, it may not remain a priority if his administration can secure its primary goals through a comprehensive deal. No matter how much the US President supported the protesters during the demonstrations in Iran, thousands of victims did not deter the US from resuming negotiations with representatives of the current leadership.
Given this divergence in approach, Israel and the Israeli lobby in the US are trying to influence the demands and preconditions outlined by the US with regard to Iran, indirectly reducing the likelihood of a successful agreement. These demands often include a total moratorium on uranium enrichment and the expatriation of existing stockpiles. The talks also cover Iran’s production of ballistic missiles and its policy in the Middle East. For many years, Iran has categorized these issues as non-negotiable “red-lines.” Both sides remain engaged in negotiations against the backdrop of these conflicting demands and statements. However, the Israeli strike on Iran last year, conducted while talks were ongoing between Iran and the US, serves as a stark reminder that a major military confrontation remains a credible threat with profound consequences for the region, and for Armenia in particular.
Regime Change via External Military Intervention
This scenario envisions the overthrow of the current government and the installation of a transitional authority. The trajectory of such an event would depend heavily on the duration of the military phase and the perceived legitimacy of the new administration. Given the systemic suppression of internal opposition, an external figure may be tapped to lead a transitional government. While Iran’s territorial integrity might be maintained, there is a distinct possibility of enforced federalization or the total fragmentation of the country.
Currently, most transitional platforms advocate for the preservation of a unified Iran, with the exception of Mojahedin-e-Khalq, which proposes autonomy for Kurdish-inhabited regions. The most prominent candidate for a transitional role is Reza Pahlavi, who lives in the US and is the son of Iran’s last shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Given that he has lived outside Iran since his teenage years, as well as his uncharismatic and politically incompetent actions, it is unlikely that he enjoys broad support among the Iranian population. However, his ambitions to serve as a unifying symbolic figure gained traction during the recent protests. This was evidenced by the slogans “Long live the Shah” and “the Shah must return” at the demonstrations both in Iran and abroad and the adherence to his logistical directives.
At the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, Pahlavi utilized a panel discussion on Iran to advocate for US military intervention and to outline his political vision: acting as a transitional administrator to oversee a national referendum rather than restoring the monarchy. According to Pahlavi, this process will allow the Iranian people themselves to determine the desired model of a free, secular, and democratic republic.
Internal Transformation without Regime Change
A shift in the balance of power towards secular institutions could facilitate a qualitative improvement in relations between Iran and the United States. Iran possesses the potential for such transformation, as its political system integrates democratic institutions with revolutionary and clerical bodies. Specifically, the head of government — the president — is an elected official, whereas several bodies that influence the country’s political decisions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Guardian Council, are composed of appointed leaders and members.
The positioning of Iranian President Pezeshkian, aimed at navigating between reformist and conservative political factions, may serve as a significant factor in favor of this contingency. Since his election, Pezeshkian has emphasized the inevitability of normalizing relations with the US. From the onset of the protests, he advocated for dialogue with the demonstrators; however, following their suppression, he also alleged that ISIS elements were present among the protesters. Notably, despite his calls for dialogue, the protesters generally refrained from directing slogans against him. Such an internal transformation, even culminating in the election of a reformist spiritual leader, could potentially resolve both domestic and external crises.
Impact on Armenia
Increasing instability could directly affect Armenia’s security environment. While Iran has not been the sole deterrent against threats to Armenia’s security in recent years, it has played a pivotal role in balancing regional dynamics. A weakened Iranian position may undermine Armenia’s strategic stability. Concurrently, the advancement of Armenian-American relations and the prospects of new economic initiatives — most notably the TRIPP project — could be jeopardized under either scenario. This holds true whether Iran faces increased economic isolation and adopts more radical political policies in response to border-related developments, or becomes a target of military strikes, prompting a kinetic response. Should large-scale military operations commence in Iran in the near future, the companies involved in building TRIPP may suspend their work due to security risks near the border.
Furthermore, Iran’s military response remains difficult to predict; it could target not only US military bases in the Middle East but also any economic ventures involving American interests. While the robust political relationship between Armenia and Iran serves as a vital security guarantee, Iranian retaliatory strikes — even if directed against Azerbaijan — could entail severe consequences for Armenia.
Internal instability in Iran could also threaten Armenia’s economic and transit interests by disrupting communication routes and increasing the risk of refugee flows and humanitarian crises. For instance, throughout the protests, Iran suspended its critical logistical role for Armenia due to the imposition of a state of emergency. If the crisis escalates into a new military confrontation, these risks would be significantly amplified. Given that defense supplies within the framework of Armenian-Indian cooperation transit through Iran, any disruption to this route could have profound implications for this bilateral partnership.
Consequently, the most perilous scenario for Armenia is protracted internal instability in Iran, regardless of whether it is triggered by external interference. The advanced age (86) of the Supreme Leader, combined with political maneuvering surrounding his succession, provide a backdrop for sustained volatility. Prominent among the contenders is Mojtaba Khamenei, son of Ali Khamenei, who was a primary target of anti-government slogans during the recent demonstrations. Given that the IRGC remains the most influential military and political force in the country, a direct seizure of power by the Corps cannot be dismissed. Should the succession further consolidate IRGC influence, leading to deeper isolation and additional sanctions, Armenia’s delicate foreign policy balance would be severely tested.
Since gaining independence, Armenia has managed to maintain an equilibrium in its relations with Iran and the West, adhering to a policy of non-alignment against either party. The emergence of a military-led regime in Iran — headed by an entity designated as a terrorist organization by the US and EU — would further constrain Armenia’s diplomatic maneuverability.
Protracted military escalation poses another grave risk: an uncontrolled influx of refugees. With Azerbaijan’s land borders remaining closed under the pretext of COVID-19, and Turkey actively preparing to block crossings (particularly to prevent a potential influx of the Kurdish population), Armenia may emerge as the sole destination for those fleeing Northern Iran.
This possibility entails multifaceted risks. Firstly, there is a looming humanitarian crisis; having absorbed over 100,000 displaced persons from Artsakh only two and a half years ago — and their social integration still ongoing — Armenia will struggle immensely to accommodate further waves of refugees. Furthermore, psychological and security risks abound. Amid domestic polarization and the tendency of Armenian politicians to harm each other at any cost, the presence of Azerbaijani-speaking Iranian nationals in Armenia provides fodder for disinformation campaigns suggesting that “Azerbaijanis have already infiltrated Armenia.” This narrative would likely intensify in the event of a mass influx of Azerbaijani-speaking refugees. Geographical proximity dictates that these populations, residing in the northern provinces, would be the first to seek refuge across the Armenian border. Ultimately, this could serve as a tool for political leverage for Baku allowing for the fusion of the “South Azerbaijan” and “West Azerbaijan” irredentist narratives, with attendant security implications. Additionally, any discussion of the refugee crisis must account for the potential evacuation of the Iranian-Armenian community, which would create further logistical and political tensions.
The most advantageous outcome for Armenia remains a diplomatic resolution between Iran and Western powers. Such a result is contingent upon successful negotiations and Iran’s willingness to enter new agreements with the US, whether within the existing political system or through its transformation.
Significantly, even before a resolution is reached, current tensions are exerting political pressure on Armenia. The statement by the Iranian Ambassador in Armenia regarding protests in Yerevan suggests that both sides may attempt to draw Armenia into taking a stance. In this context, Armenia’s priority must be the maintenance of neutrality while adhering to its democratic values and strategic trajectory. Simultaneously, the handling of Iranian protesters — which requires legal tact — and the surrounding media outcry present a precarious challenge to both internal and external security. The challenge of preserving democratic values without destabilizing an extremely fragile security environment or succumbing to hybrid threats will remain Armenia’s primary dilemma for the foreseeable future.
The Iranian crisis likewise poses difficult dilemmas for Armenian civil society: how can one advocate for human rights in Iran without compromising Armenian national security? How can one critique human rights violations in Iran while avoiding any rhetoric that supports military intervention. While such dilemmas are global, they are exceptionally acute for a nation bordering Iran that has a fragile democracy and continues to navigate two closed borders.
The Content of the article is the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Heinrich Boell Foundation Tbilisi Office - South Caucasus Region.