David and Goliath: Small Political Parties in Armenia

Key Features of the Political System

According to international studies and reports, Armenia is classified as a transitional democracy or hybrid regime, marked by relative stability of democratic institutions along with the signs of democratic backsliding. Following the 2015 constitutional changes, Armenia adopted a parliamentary form of government. Today, the ruling Civil Contract party holds a constitutional majority in the National Assembly, which enables it to implement significant legislative changes without opposition approval. However, it undermines parliamentary checks and balances. This is compounded by the powers of a so-called “super prime minister,” as defined by the constitution for the head of the ruling party, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. This system, inherited from the previous ruling party — the Republican Party of Armenia, led by Serzh Sargsyan — has not only remained unchanged despite promises made during the 2018 revolution, but has been further strengthened through a series of legislative amendments that expanded the powers of the prime minister.

The defeat in the 2020 war and the forced displacement of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh have dealt a serious blow to the credibility and public support of the ruling party. According to recent polls, the approval ratings for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Civil Contract party stand at 16 and 20 percent, respectively. Moreover, 61 percent of respondents do not trust any politician. Despite this decline in support for the government, the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition, small parties, and other political actors have thus failed to capitalize on the government’s decline in popularity, putting public expectations and hopes on hold. The parliamentary opposition remains unpopular and unable to attract voters disillusioned with the Civil Contract. As of early 2025, the opposition represented in the National Assembly is incapable of mounting a serious challenge to the ruling party. Meanwhile, fragmented and weak coalitions among small and extra-parliamentary parties make them more likely to compete with one another rather than to present a united front against the government.

Ideological Orientations of Parties

Following Armenia’s independence, the newly formed political parties largely adopted right-wing, conservative, and nationalist ideologies. The Armenian National Movement, along with other parties that emerged from the Karabakh Movement, embraced nationalism as a central ideological pillar. Initially, the Karabakh Movement was organized to advocate for the self-determination of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh within the borders of the USSR. However, it soon evolved into a broader pro-independence campaign. While the movement was politically nationalistic, it also incorporated elements of economic liberalism, including support for a free market economy, low taxes, and the promotion of private enterprise. In the context of a “neither war, nor peace” environment,  Armenia’s ruling parties (mostly parliamentary) positioned themselves as nationalist, right-wing forces. Their platforms emphasized the nation-state, defence against external threats, and the central role of the family in society.

Smaller parties have also aligned themselves with nationalist ideologies, at times presenting themselves as “more Catholic than the Pope,” adopting more extreme and militant rhetoric. Many of these parties are characterized by highly personalized leadership, built around improvised or symbolic ideologies, engaging in “political merchandise,”  and functioning as instruments of their founders or key leaders.

In the 2000s, the emergence of left-leaning and socially oriented parties — partly driven by modest improvements in socio-economic conditions — also incorporated nationalist elements in their platforms. However, the situation changed dramatically after the 2020 war. The defeat, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the forced displacement of ethnic Armenians deeply undermined the appeal of nationalist ideology, dealing a blow to its credibility and weakening its influence. This shift is analyzed in more detail by researcher Tigran Mughnetsyan in his article.

The 2018 Velvet Revolution opened new perspectives for left-wing parties in Armenia. The revolution’s focus on social issues, improved public administration, and anti-corruption measures — combined with its decentralized, networked nature that did not heavily rely on material resources — created favourable conditions for smaller parties.

In this context, parties advocating green ideology may gain particular traction in Yerevan and in regions where issues such as ecotourism, environmental protection, sustainable development, natural resource management (mining), and climate change are central concerns. These topics often mobilize citizens to organise around their own agendas and policy goals. Moreover, green politics can serve as a platform for parties to promote broader values such as social justice, protection of labor rights, gender democracy and equality, and women’s participation. By addressing gender-based violence and fostering inclusive, sustainable governance, green-oriented parties can contribute to the development of a more equitable political system. 

Yerevan faces serious environmental problems, including air pollution, overpopulation, and destruction of green spaces. These issues are particularly pressing for the city’s middle class, which effectively represents Armenia’s middle class overall, given that nearly half of the country’s population resides in the metropolitan area of Yerevan (with satellite towns or suburbs). Environmental concerns have the potential to resonate widely, especially among younger citizens. In the most recent elections to Yerevan’s Council of Elders, voter turnout reached a historic low of just 29 percent — the lowest in the past thirty years. This signals fatigue with traditional political narratives and campaign promises. At the same time, latest polls indicate that 60 percent of Yerevan’s residents are looking for new political actors to enter the scene. Armenia’s status as a mining country presents additional environmental and social challenges, especially in the regions, and green parties can mediate between market and public interests.

Small Parties and the Trap of Personalist Tradition

In academic literature, terms such as “micro,” “secondary,” or “niche” are often used to describe the scale, and operational style of political parties. In this analysis, the term “small” is employed, as it more accurately reflects the Armenian context. Small parties are a common feature in political systems globally. Compared to mainstream parties, they operate with limited resources and constrained access to political media platforms. Since independence, Armenia has been consistently governed by dominant parties or ruling alliances.

In the post-Soviet era, the Armenian National  Movement was formed as a broad, big-tent party born out of the Karabakh Movement. However, subsequent fragmentation rooted in personal rivalries led to the creation of smaller parties. The split between the leaders of the Armenian National Movement, Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Vazgen Manukyan resulted in the formation of the “Manukyan faction” and the establishment of the National Democratic Union. 

Crucially, both small and large Armenian share a defining feature: a personalist model of organization. Most of the parties did not emerge from the Karabakh Movement or any other broad social movements or ideological platforms, but instead  were founded “from scratch.” Small parties in Armenia not only follow this tradition but embody it most fully. They are mostly “assembled” around individual leaders — typically figures with charisma and access to resources. This tendency was further entrenched by the highly personalized nature of Armenia’s early presidential system, which concentrated power in the hands of a single winner, and encouraged electoral politics focused more on personalities than on programs or policies.

In Armenia, presidential elections with prominent, clearly defined leaders have long played a central role in political life. As a result, party formation centered around individual personalities. A typical small, personalist party is structured around an outstanding, bright, charismatic personality — a political “entrepreneur” who either takes over an existing party or creates a new one, often promoting personal interests. In such configurations, the party becomes an extension of the leader’s authority. It is the leader who determines the party’s platform, ideological orientation of the campaign, candidate selection, and resource allocation.

The party’s survival depends on the leader’s private assets: financial, administrative, symbolic capital — and even physical presence as many of these parties operate as long as their founder remains active. This model persisted across Armenia’s political landscape from Prosperous Armenia under Gagik Tsarukyan,  and the Armenian National Congress led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan to the Union of National Self-Determination with Paruyr Hayrikyan, the National Democratic Union founded by Vazgen Manukyan, and   Civil Contract led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. All of them, whether large or small, are personalist parties, affiliated with one leader. This structure reflects a lack of internal democracy and highlights deficiencies in party governance and accountability. Electoral performance in terms of votes and mandates is equally telling. According to Armenia’s current Electoral Code, the threshold for gaining parliamentary representation is 4 percent for parties and 6 percent for alliances. Yet, Armenia’s political landscape continues to be dominated by small parties, most of which fail to surpass even 1-3 percent range, whether running independently or in alliances. In the 2022 parliamentary elections, only four political forces—two parties and two alliances — managed to exceed the 3 percent threshold. In other words, even the 4 percent barrier remains insurmountable for approximately 80 percent of participating  parties.

Legal and Financial Barriers

After the adoption of the 2015 Constitution, Armenia transitioned from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary form of government, including a fully proportional electoral model. Parties became the main political actors. While this shift created new opportunities for small parties, it also imposed significant constraints on them.

First, the threshold was set at 4 percent — an almost insurmountable barrier in the Armenian context, where voter turnout is often low, financial resources are limited, and many citizens remain apathetic or disillusioned.  Often, less than half of eligible voters participate in elections.

A second major hurdle was the introduction of the majority bonus system. It was borrowed from the Italian electoral framework by the previous ruling party, the Republican Party of Armenia, and justified as a safeguard against external threats and a means of ensuring political stability. “The National Assembly is a place for large and serious parties,” government representatives claimed.

The provision stipulates that if no party secures more than 50 percent of parliamentary mandates, and qualifying parties are unable to form a governing coalition, the party with the highest vote count is granted additional mandates to ensure a parliamentary majority. This rule only applies to national parliamentary elections and does not extend to elections to local self-government bodies. For instance, under the current system, a party with just 20-30 percent of the vote can unilaterally form a parliamentary majority and consequently, a government. This mechanism has effectively become a tool for single-party dominance in parliament. It still remains in force and is likely to be used in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2026. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe criticised this provision, stating that it “unduly limits the possibility of building a political coalition.”

Logically, if no party secures a majority in the first round, a second round of elections can be held, allowing smaller parties to form or join alliances, thereby gaining influence and representation in both parliament and government. However, the current provision in the Electoral Code poses a significant obstacle for small parties, which often operate with limited human and financial resources. As a result, they are compelled to affiliate with larger parties or, at best, settle for roles as“junior” or “secondary” partners in hopes of securing a couple of parliamentary mandates.

Financial constraints represent another significant challenge. Party budgets are primarily composed of membership fees (either annual or one-time), donations, and limited economic activities such as publishing newspapers, renting out property, or earning interest on deposits. While the law provides for state funding, access is restricted to parties that surpass a certain threshold in elections. Furthermore, if a party generates income through its own activities, it becomes ineligible for public funding.

In fact, fundraising remains the most viable method of securing financial resources. However,  there have been numerous instances when even the ruling party has resorted to non-transparent and dubious fundraising practices — an approach mirrored by opposition parties.

Moreover, in Armenia, an individual’s annual donation to a political party cannot exceed 2.5 million AMD, and corporate contributions are prohibited. These issues are compounded by a weak party culture and low levels of public support, both of which undermine stable income sources and, by extension, party independence. This situation may stem from Soviet-era formalized party membership and persisting narratives against public policy that have contributed to a widespread perception of politics as inherently corrupt or “dirty.”

New Dynamics and Rules of the Game

The 2023 Yerevan municipal elections revealed that amid the discrediting of the parliamentary opposition and the ruling party’s inability to secure a majority of votes, small parties are gaining momentum, reshuffling the cards of the major players and influencing government formation. Contrary to political expectations, small independent parties chose to support the ruling party and its candidate rather than backing the opposition. In this context, the smaller parties such as the Republic Party and the Public Voice Party, played a decisive role in the mayoral election by the Council of Elders. The ruling party, unable to secure a majority on its own, formed a coalition with one of the small parties and gained additional support from the other. As a result, small parties became a decisive factor in this political imbalance, influencing the formation of the municipal government and becoming both coalition partners and indirect supporters of the authorities.

Alternative political players who might bring fresh perspectives remain weak, underdeveloped, or lack public legitimacy and recognition. These are primarily personalist parties built around individual leaders, operating mostly in the digital sphere and becoming active only during elections. This suggests that the once-dominant ideologies (nationalism, conservatism) and party movement models that shaped the political landscape of the newly independent Republic of Armenia (Armenian National Movement, Civil Contract) have largely exhausted themselves.  The political apathy of the population — evidenced by low voter turnout and waning trust in politicians, parties, and state institutions— has become a defining factor. However, these new realities also present opportunities for smaller parties. The polarization and fragmentation of society enable small parties to carve out a niche and build a stable, albeit small, electorate. When no single party is able to gather a decisive majority, they gain unexpected relevance through their votes and become attractive coalition partners. Notable examples of this in recent decades are Germany and Israel, where small parties play a pivotal role in coalition governance.

However, in Armenia’s case, the primary challenge lies in legislative barriers, particularly the Electoral Code’s provisions on the stable majority, which hinders political coalitions and limits prospects for small parties. Additionally, the ban on donations from anonymous and legal entities is also a serious obstacle. While aimed at curbing the influence of business and private interests, it ends up restricting weak and small parties. By contrast, oligarchic or ruling parties often find ways to circumvent these restrictions.

To some extent, the internet and information technologies offer a lifeline to small parties. In the era dominated by large parties, traditional media such as newspapers, television, and radio favoured parties with substantial resources according to their scale. Today, however, amid increasing media and social fragmentation, digital technologies are transforming the competitiveness of small parties.

Thanks to the low cost of digital outreach and the power of network effects, small parties have the tools to clearly identify, target, and mobilize their supporters, and attract new voters. These technologies act as a kind of David’s slingshot against Goliath, leveling the playing field and encouraging greater competition. Besides opening up real opportunities for small parties, the digital era also presents challenges. If they succeed in breaking free from the trap of personalist tradition, harnessing digital tools effectively and cultivating a consistent base, they can emerge as influential players in coalition politics and policy-making.