Systemic Democratic Change? Armenia’s Achievements and Shortcomings since the Velvet Revolution

Understanding Post-Revolution Armenia: Reform Vs. Change

Six years have passed since the revolution in Armenia. And it is still hard to assess the results of the revolution. Even if we leave aside the external challenges[i] and focus on the internal situation, the results of the revolution seem to be mixed. On the one hand, in many spheres, the reform process has been lagging behind the expectations of society. At the same time, within these six years, Armenia has gone through immense changes: Today’s Armenia is a very different country from the one where people came out to the streets back in 2018. In fact, based on the realities on the ground, one can construct two completely opposite narratives of what is happening in Armenia today. 

One of these narratives is quite dark. Many Armenians are disappointed with the revolution and the political forces that it brought to power. The defeat in the war of 2020, the subsequent border clashes in 2021-2022, and the ethnic cleansing of Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 have caused an immense trauma to Armenian society. Society is polarized and political discussions are extremely toxic. Many ordinary Armenians have lost trust in all politicians and surrendered to political apathy: about two-thirds of Armenians do not trust any politicians and about a third do not plan to vote. Moreover, some have turned to extreme nationalists or social populists[ii]. People who ruled Armenia before the revolution have not been punished for the corruption and crimes they committed when in power. Moreover, political forces representing the pre-revolutionary elite have been able to resurface in the political field, controlling a large part of the media landscape and securing one third of the seats in the Armenian parliament. In some circles of society, it has almost become mauvais tone to talk positively about the revolution or the current government.

However, one could also describe things in a more positive light. Armenia is a functioning democracy, where civil and political rights of the citizens are largely respected. Elections are competitive and their results are recognized by everyone, including the losers. Armenia’s press freedom and internet freedom ratings are quite high. While Armenia’s democracy is far from perfect, Armenia is more democratic than most of the countries of the region[iii]. Even more obvious is the progress in the field of economy. After 2018, Armenia’s economy has been growing for 6 years straight (with the obvious exception of 2020, when it contracted due to pandemic and war). Armenia’s GDP per capita has grown more than two-fold since 2017, from 4042 USD in 2017 to 8715 USD. The Armenian currency, Dram, has been growing steadily since 2018, having appreciated around 25 % against the US Dollar since the revolution. While emigration continues to be an issue, for the first time in its modern history, Armenia has also seen an influx of migrants, mostly from Russia and India. After a series of political crises, the internal political situation has more or less stabilized. According to polls, the ruling party is significantly ahead of all its rivals, and Pashinyan is the most trusted politician in the country[iv], even though overall approval rating remains quite low. 

The strangest thing about these two contradicting narratives is that both are based on facts. This paradox, in my view, has to do with the difference between the concepts of “democratic reform” (i.e. the agenda of specific legal and institutional adjustments introduced from above by the executive and legislative powers), and “democratic change” in a wider sense, including societal change, which happens both from above and from below. When assessed from the point of view of a “reform” framework, serious problems are obvious. However, when assessed using a broader framework that includes societal change, it is obvious that Armenian society today has come a long way since the revolution. This change includes such dramatic transformations as shift from authoritarian to democratic practices (particularly when it comes to elections), as well as a transition from a quasi-feudal socio-economic system to a more modern and liberal one.

In order to understand the nature of this change, we need to realize that the nature of the Armenian pre-revolutionary regime was determined not by the normative framework of laws and regulations, but by the practices and the worldview behind those. It was a corrupt authoritarian regime ruled by oligarchy, behind a democratic façade. The revolution removed the power of oligarchy, and the democratic façade, put up by this oligarchic elite to conceal and legitimize its power, became a functioning democratic framework, opening the way for Armenia’s development. From an authoritarian regime with a closed oligarchic economy, Armenia became a country with a functioning electoral system and a competitive market economy. Even though the tragedy of Nagorno-Karabakh made this transformation more difficult and painful, but could not stop it.

However, it is also important to see that the new situation also brings new problems, in fields like environment, labor rights, housing, protection of historical heritage and urban spaces, migration, public health (including issue of rising drug use), and many others. At the moment it seems that neither the political forces nor the civil society are well equipped to deal with these new issues. Besides, the slow pace of institutional reform means that, in certain circumstances, the positive changes that have taken place in Armenia might be rolled back.

Pashinyan’s Beard and the Fate of Armenia’s Reform

The current government of Armenia, headed by Nikol Pashinyan, understands that the expectations of many citizens regarding reforms have not been met. This is one of the probable causes for a dramatic cabinet overhaul, which took place in November 2024. It all started when prime-minister Nikol Pashinyan shaved his beard and published a short video about it, which went viral and created a storm on social media. Pashinyan’s beard had become an important part of his image since the revolution of 2018. Some of Pashinyan’s critics tried to find a hidden meaning behind the disappearance of his beard[v]. The next day Pashinyan chastised his own team for failing the meet the expectations of the people, particularly in the field of justice and anti-corruption. 6 important officials resigned, including two cabinet ministers and the heads of most law-enforcement agencies. In his remarks preceding the resignations, Pashinyan claimed that his “cup of patience” had run out, because “we have invested heavily in these reforms, yet we are still faced with dissatisfaction and a lack of results”. 

The claim that the government has been slow in implementing reform, or even that it has completely failed in certain spheres, is a common criticism against Pashinyan’s government. As it often happens, the actual situation on the ground is more complicated. This criticism is not ungrounded, to say the least. Overall reform in the police sector has been lagging behind, failing to bring the transformation of the law enforcement, which Armenians were hoping for. Cases of police violence are still abundant. Methods of police work remain crude and clumsy. To bring just one example, music clubs have been raided under the pretext of fighting illegal drugs use. Some cases have been a cause for public outrage, especially the case of Sona Mnatsakanyan, a pregnant woman hit to death by a car that was part of prime-minister’s motorcade. The courts still lack public trust, being the second least trusted institution in the country (after the parliament). However, it is also true that many reforms have been implemented, or at least the reform process has started. Thus, Armenia has implemented its anti-corruption agenda, which includes the establishment of specific anti-corruption bodies. While police reform overall remains a cause for concern, there have been some successful reforms implemented, particularly the establishment of the patrol service. When it comes to the security sector, where the National Security Service, derived from the Soviet KGB, has so far been dominant, reforms will reduce the influence of NSS, as some of its powers are transferred to newly created bodies, such as the Foreign Intelligence Service, headed by well-respected former ombudswoman Kristine Grigoryan. 

In any case, the pace of reform has not matched the expectations of a large part of the society, which were extremely high after the revolution of 2018. It can be explained by both objective and subjective factors. On the one hand, during the 6 years since the revolution of 2018, Armenia had to deal with existential threats[vi], internal instability and geopolitical turmoil. This volatile and hostile environment hardly provided a conducive atmosphere for implementing an ambitious reform agenda. However, part of the problem was that in many spheres, Pashinyan’s government lacked a comprehensive strategy and vision of reform. When Pashinyan’s party came to power as a result of the revolution, it was a wide alliance of people with different views, united by their opposition to the authoritarian system and general loyalty to democratic values. With time, Civil Contract acquired a clearer political vision, which allows to qualify it as a centrist liberal political force, though on specific issues, it may adopt neo-liberal or social-democratic policies. This transformation means that the government will probably be more consistent and predictable in implementing reforms. However, time has been lost, and today, Pashinyan’s party no longer has the political capital that it had immediately after the revolution. In addition, Pashinyan has incorporated into his team former officials who had held posts in the pre-revolutionary period. This was probably an unavoidable measure, otherwise the state apparatus might have been completely shattered. But it came with a price: not all government officials are willing or able to pursue the reform agenda. 

From Hybrid Regime to Electoral Democracy

In spite of all this, Armenia experienced immense change after 2018. To understand that change we need to distinguish between the de jure framework and the underlying de facto reality of pre-revolution Armenia. Modern authoritarian regimes tend to adopt a democratic façade. Various concepts have been suggested to describe this phenomenon, such as “hybrid regime”, “competitive authoritarianism”[vii], or, with regard to Armenia, “Potemkin democracy”[viii]. The revolution of 2018 transformed the country, not because it changed the normative framework (though there had been changes here as well), but because it transformed the underlying de facto reality, resulting in actual democratic practices.

One of the spheres where change is most obvious is that of elections. Prior to 2018, Armenia’s elections were regularly won by politicians and parties that represented the incumbent government[ix]. The methods that secured election win for the incumbent governments went through an evolution from crude and violent in the 1990s to more sophisticated and less detectable ones by the late 2010s[x]. Opposition was allowed to function, take part in elections, and receive some share of the votes unless it had a real chance of taking power, in which case it was subjected to repression (e.g., in 1996, 2004, 2008). More often than not, the opposition refused to accept election results and accused the government of fraud. As a result, elections were often followed by mass protests, which, if they became dangerous, were crushed by the government[xi]. The same happened on a smaller scale in local self-government elections: opposition candidates were extremely unlikely to win municipal elections, especially in the larger cities.

 Things changed after 2018. Of course, there needs to be a disclaimer that Armenia has not yet experienced a change of government through elections. But the nature of the electoral process has changed significantly. When in December 2018 Pashinyan’s “My Step” alliance won about 70 % of the votes in the parliamentary election, the election results were almost unanimously accepted by civil society, international monitors, and even the losing parties. In 2021, Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won 54 % of the votes. Even though the election took place against the background of an internal political crisis, this time as well the election results were accepted by the civil society, international monitors, and, with some reservations, by the losing parties. While there had been accusations against the ruling party (alleging use of administrative resources) and the opposition (alleging voter bribing), the scale of these accusations was incomparable to those levelled against incumbents in the past. Moreover, the radical opposition, which had been out in the streets demanding Pashinyans’ resignation for months, stopped the protests after the election and took up their mandates in parliament. Thus, unlike the previous elections, which had served as catalysts for mass protests and political crises (e.g., in 1996, 2003, 2008, 2013), the 2021 elections did exactly the opposite - they helped to disperse a political crisis, channeling the political struggle from the streets into parliament. Moreover, unlike previous elections, when the victory of the incumbent was obvious all along, in 2021, nobody knew what the election results would be, something which distinguishes a democratic system from a non-democratic one. 

A similar change occurred with regard to local elections. Before 2018, members of the incumbent political force or its allies were almost guaranteed to win the elections. This situation changed after 2018. Though Civil Contract candidates have won in many local elections, cases when independent or opposition candidates win local elections are no longer seen as an exception. Of course, here as well, things are far from perfect. Local elections have been marred by clashes, accusations of fraud, court cases of candidates against each other, and other messy stuff. Still, what has changed is the fact that real competition between parties takes place, with an unpredictable outcome. A vivid example of this was the city council election in Yerevan in September 2023. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract failed to secure a majority in the city council, even though it received a plurality of votes (33 %). Eventually, Civil Contract was able to form a coalition with the pro-Western “Republic” party and appoint its candidate as mayor. However, this was only due to the fact that the three opposition parties, who could have formed a majority coalition together, failed to reach an agreement. True, in this case as well, there were accusations of use of administrative resources. But, overall, the election showed that today in Armenia politics remains highly competitive and the outcome of any election is unpredictable just as it should be the case in a democratic polity.

Bourgeois Revolution: Overcoming Armenian Neo-Feudalism

Another attribute of Armenia’s pre-revolution de facto reality was a quasi-feudal socio-economic system. To use Marxist terms, prior to the revolution, Armenian society had many of the attributes of late feudalism. Some scholars have spoken about a “neo-feudal” system in Armenian society in the 2000s, more specifically of “democratic feudalism or feudal democracy”[xii]. This quasi-feudal system existed in the political, social and economic realms and had its expression in the cultural dimension. Of course, in terms of legal regulatory framework, Armenia was a society consisting of individuals with equal rights and obligations and a free market economy. However, this framework concealed a quasi-feudal system in which a quasi-feudal caste of so-called “oligarchs” was above everyone else.

The commanding heights in the economy were divided among each other by the so-called oligarchs, i.e. business-owners who were either state officials or had close links to state officials. Certain “oligarchs” had de facto assigned specific monopolies[xiii]. Obviously, this was not achieved through “royal edicts”, as in late medieval Europe, but through practice. Anybody who tried to initiate business activities in a field reserved for a certain oligarch faced either obstacles from state bodies, like tax or customs authorities, or direct violence from the oligarchs’ goons. The quasi-feudal system also had a territorial dimension: certain “oligarchs” enjoyed special influence over certain territories, which could be described as quasi-feudal fiefdoms[xiv]. Again, this kind of special influence was not assigned through any normative legal acts. It was realized through the “feudal’s” links to the government. Often, it was enforced by gangs of armed men, who had the official status of “bodyguards”, distinguishable by their athletic physique and huge cars, usually jeeps[xv]. Ignoring the power of the quasi-feudals within their quasi-fiefdoms was potentially dangerous for one’s life. 

Within this quasi-feudal reality, a certain elite caste emerged, comprised of state officials, oligarchs, and other people who were under their patronage (relatives, friends, “bodyguards”, etc.). Members of this quasi-feudal aristocracy often intimidated or used violence against ordinary citizens with little consequences for themselves. Probably, one of the first such cases, which set the precedent for decades, was the case of Poghos Poghosyan, a man beaten to death by the bodyguards of the president Robert Kocharyan[xvi]. Sometimes, especially towards the end of the regime, such cases led to protests, as in the case of Vahe Avetyan, a doctor beaten to death by the bodyguards of the oligarch Ruben Hayrapetyan. Sometimes, there were also conflicts within this elite, which, typically for a feudal system, were settled by “the sovereign”. This was the case when the former mayor of Yerevan Gagik Beglaryan beat up an assistant to the president because the latter had asked Beglaryan’s wife to move her seat at an opera concert (she was sitting too close to the president, something prohibited by protocol). In this case, Beglaryan had overstepped his privileges, so he had to resign. However, the majority of ordinary Armenians knew that a conflict with a member of the quasi-feudal elite could have had disastrous consequences.

This quasi-feudal system also had its ideological and cultural dimensions. While in terms of its façade, the ideology of the Armenian state was a mixture of nationalism and pseudo-democratic rhetoric, in reality, the quasi-feudal system was upheld by the so-called “goghakan” (referring to the criminal world) system of values[xvii]․ A modified version of this value system, based on glorification of force and extreme machismo, was the underlying ideological pillar that supported the dominance of the oligarchic elite. It also had its manifestations in culture, which can be summarized as “qyartu” subculture, which included certain style of dress (mostly dark clothes, particularly sport outfits, leather jackets and golden chains), music of “blatnoy” and “rabiz” genres[xviii], and kitschy neo-classical trends in architecture, represented by the palaces of the oligarchs.

The revolution dealt a strong blow to the quasi-feudal elements in Armenia’s life. The very fact that thousands of ordinary citizens defied the police and the brigands of oligarchs, using non-violent means, represented a defeat of the quasi-feudal elite. The “oligarchs” were forced to submit to unarmed people, ruining their own self-image and system of values based on violence and machismo. After the revolution, criminal cases and investigations were initiated against representatives of the quasi-feudal elite. These investigations had mixed results, leading to indictment and the return of stolen property in some cases, dragging for years in others, and ending in acquittal in some. 

The perceived failure of the current government to prosecute members of the old quasi-feudal elite is a major cause of disappointment in the society. Moreover, relics of the quasi-feudal system remain. In some local communities, the “feudals” remain quite influential. Many “oligarchs” have transformed into respectable businesspeople who do not interfere with state affairs any more but continue to be top players in the economy[xix]. Some of the property of the old elite has been confiscated but kitschiest palaces are still enjoyed by their owners, while ordinary Armenians struggle due to rising rent. Pashinyan is accused of incorporating some of the old “oligarchs” into his team[xx], and some of the members of his team are accused of corruption and nepotism. All this creates resentment among many Armenians, aimed not only against the old elite but also against the current government. However, overall, the system of quasi-feudal relations that existed before the revolution has been largely destroyed, and a return to it seems impossible. At least for now.

What Next? Armenian Capitalism and Its Discontents

In spite of all the positive changes, there are still many reasons to be worried. And not only because of Armenia’s national security issues, which remain unsolved. The discrepancy between societal change and the reform agenda means that the changes that have taken place in Armenian society have not been matched with similar changes in the country’s normative framework and institutions. And this, in turn, means that in certain conditions, these societal changes may be rolled back. 

Besides, the new situation has brought new challenges, which Armenian society is not yet ready to address and sometimes even to notice and understand. As the quasi-feudal system has been destroyed, today, Armenian society is faced with free market capitalism, a change that has a bright and a dark side. Probably, even the most hardline Marxist would consider the transition from a quasi-feudal system to free market capitalism a sign of progress. However, the forces of market capitalism, unleashed by the revolution and cherished by Armenia’s pro-business government, bring new challenges. 

Here are some of these new challenges: environmental destruction, encroachment on labor rights, destruction of historical heritage, rising property prices and rents, which might escalate into a housing crisis, unregulated migration, rising drug use, growing contrasts between the Yerevan metropolitan area and the rest of the country. Not only the government and opposition but also the media, civil society, and the expert community have difficulty understanding and even noticing some of these challenges. With the exception of a few activists and intellectuals, few bring these issues into the scope of the political discussion. The government is mostly pre-occupied with raising economic growth, and the opposition is dominated by right wing conservative groups who advance conspiracy theories and nationalist ressentiment. Few political forces exist that try to challenge the government from a left-wing perspective, raising such issues as labor rights, environmental protection, and inequality, not to mention women’s rights and LGBTQ issues, which are almost non-existent in Armenian political discussions. The civil society could have raised this new agenda, but that would also demand a serious change of perspective. While some organizations and individuals are doing a great job, trying to bring such issues into the mainstream discussion, a large part of Armenia’s civil society seems to be living in the past. Thus, some criticize the government for allegedly reproducing the old system, which is in most cases unfair. Others adopt the language of the right-wing nationalist conservative forces, criticizing the government for an alleged “betrayal” of Armenian national interests. 

As a result, in many issues where the government needs to be criticized “from the left”, there is a lack of attention both from opposition and civil society. Take, for example, such issues as continued mineral mining, the construction boom that is destroying urban environments, public spaces and historical legacy, noise pollution, labor rights, freedom of religion, etc. In addition, there are some issues which are completely new for Armenia, and neither the government nor the civil society have a clear understanding about how to deal with them, such as the issue of integration of immigrants or dealing with growing drug use[xxi]. Armenia’s civil society and political forces need to look beyond their old patterns and catch up with the new challenges. Otherwise, as the experience of even much more stable democracies shows, these issues may be hijacked by populists and demagogues, and that would not make the future better for anyone. And, as the institutional reforms are lagging behind, such a development could endanger the positive changes that have happened, leading to an authoritarian backsliding.

* The author uses both internationally recognized terms and Armenian toponyms related to Nagorno-Karabakh. 
* The contents of this article are the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Heinrich Boell Stiftung Tbilisi Office – South Caucasus Region.
* This article was prepared in October 2024. Any events, developments, or updates that occurred after this date are not reflected in this article.