Criminal Subculture in Politics: Practices and Challenges of Combating Them

The integration of groups associated with the criminal subculture into the Armenian political landscape dates back to the formation of the first parliament in 1990. While not initially widespread and systematic, sporadic  instances occurred, particularly within specific districts of Yerevan. During the 1990s, this phenomenon manifested predominantly through military personnel who had gained influence during the 1991-1994 Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the subsequent establishment of pro-government paramilitary structures and NGOs, such as the Yerkrapah (Defenders of the Land). Their role was noticeable both at the local level—via their influence over citizens’ political will and their support for the ruling party—and through their illicit interference in the privatization of state property inherited from the USSR. In the 1990s, these groups which integrated into government bodies and consolidated leverage across various trade and industrial sectors, were commonly referred to as “mafias.” According to qualitative research data collected at the time, terms such as the “gasoline mafia,” “bread mafia,” “gas mafia” and other similar names dominated public discourse. 

Following subsequent transformations, these mafia groups evolved into criminal-oligarchic circles. In the wake of the 1999 parliamentary elections, several influential figures from the aforementioned paramilitary structures secured positions within political and state institutions. Among them were numerous individuals with close ties to criminal syndicates and “local strongmen” who had already gained notoriety for their illicit activities. 

The 2003 parliamentary elections marked a qualitatively new phase in the infiltration of criminal circles into the political system, as a significant number of figures bearing underworld monikers, emblematic of criminal-oligarchic circles, entered parliament. The year is regarded as the onset of the systematic integration of the criminal subculture into the political arena, particularly concerning the formation and exercise of power. The proportion of lawmakers with nicknames remained practically unchanged during the 2007 and 2012 parliamentary elections. Over these years, the institution of “local strongmen” acquired a decisive role in swaying the population’s political will and securing votes for the ruling party across both national and local self-government bodies. Vote-buying practices became pervasive and entrenched, with the organizational work falling to “district strongmen" and “fixers” who wielded influence on people on the ground. Notably, the concept and institution of “fixers” carry criminal origins. In the penal system, these are underworld leaders who handle matters for various inmate factions — ranging from resolving disputes and coordinating the circulation of various “goods” (tobacco, outside food, drugs, currency, etc.), to mediating relations with the prison administration and maintaining external contact. 

The dismantling of this system, conceived in the 1990s, and crystallized in the 2000s, began with the 2018 Velvet Revolution. However, the efforts to combat this phenomenon and neutralize its influence on social and political life have encountered significant friction.

Qualitative Characteristics of the Criminal Subculture Within the Political System. The Formation of Vlast System

The integration of criminal and quasi-criminal circles into the processes of political and state governance during these years occurred on multiple levels. The primary level involved the participation of organized criminal elements and “district authorities” in pre-election and electoral processes. Members of this subculture exerted certain influence over the local populace, particularly men, which was used to mobilize neighborhood votes in favor of the ruling political force. It is essential to distinguish between crime bosses, district kingpins, and “fixers.” Crime bosses hold high-ranking positions within the criminal underworld itself. District kingpins and fixers do not necessarily command elevated rank within the mafia hierarchy. Rather, in their daily lives, they are guided by the concepts, norms, and unwritten laws of the underworld. They maintain good relations with prominent crime bosses and exert considerable influence over the local male community. 

A second, more consequential level of involvement was the infiltration of legislative, executive, and judicial bodies by individuals adhering to the criminal value system — specifically, spanning the National Assembly, regional and local government bodies, ministries, courts, and the prosecutor’s office. A substantial number of such individuals served in local self-government bodies as mayors and village heads. This was evident in the country's second and third largest cities, as well as across several municipal administrations in Yerevan. In various provinces, these figures even held the position of the governor (marzpet). Some eventually ascended to the office of Mayor of Yerevan. Furthermore, officials with criminal ties occupied key ministerial posts within the state administration and judicial system. Currently, criminal proceedings have been initiated against many of these individuals; some have fled Armenia and remain wanted by law enforcement.

Through the collaboration between criminal and quasi-criminal local authorities and the political leadership during those years, a unique system of power emerged, colloquially termed “vlast,” the Russian word for “power.” Semantically, this concept is linked to the notion of power wielded by leaders at the highest echelons of the criminal underworld. A distinctive feature of the vlast system was that representatives of the criminal sphere did not directly enter state or political institutions, such as parliament or political parties. Instead, they provided logistical support services to the ruling elite who occupied designated positions within the hierarchy of power. In return, the political elite granted them privileges allowing them to assert control over the local population, settle disputes, conduct illegal businesses, and engage in similar activities. The individuals holding political and administrative posts — though not strictly embedded within the criminal underworld — frequently employed criminal methods, language, and rhetoric in both their political and everyday lives. 

Consequently, up until the 2018 Velvet Revolution, society was divided into a privileged class possessing vlast and an underprivileged class stripped of its rights and deprived of protection. Those holding vlast comprised segments of society capable of resolving issues of varying scale and nature, simultaneously securing broad opportunities to engage in lucrative economic activities shielded from public scrutiny. At the top of the vlast hierarchy sat high-ranking government officials, followed by criminal figures of various ranks, with local fixers relegated to the bottom. Every resident of a district, provincial town or village knew that a particular business or “object” belonged to someone operating under the protection of either a criminal figure, or a government official.

The essence of the vlast system was that, by using the mechanisms of power at its disposal, it systematically alienated citizens from political institutions and economically lucrative sectors, reducing them to a mass of disenfranchised individuals living in fear and complete dependence on those in power. 

The Velvet Revolution and the Decline of the Vlast System

Throughout the history of independent Armenia, the vlast system established by the privileged criminal-oligarchic regime has sparked widespread popular protests and resistance. Beginning with the large-scale demonstrations in the wake of the 1996 presidential election, followed by the wave of popular uprisings in 2003, the protests of February 2008, and the events of March 11, all the mass movements following subsequent electoral cycles were fundamentally aimed at dismantling the institution of vlast. Citizens sought to end lawlessness and restrain the dominance of criminal-oligarchic cliques that used this system to secure their privileges over the rest of society.

This struggle culminated in the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Its main goal was to liberate political and economic institutions from the privileged elites and ensure their accessibility and inclusivity for all citizens. In essence, the post-2018 developments represent a process — one that remains incomplete — of dismantling the criminal vlast system and transitioning from extractive to constructive governance. In this context, it was unsurprising that the majority of voters re-elected Prime Minister Pashinyan and the governing force in the 2021 parliamentary elections. Despite the disastrous defeat in the 44-Day War, many citizens recognized that from the perspective of the nation’s future trajectory, the fundamental choice remained between rejecting the vlast system a or reverting to the forces that embodied it — forces that had come to power as a result of the first Nagorno Karabakh war. The people chose the former.

What has the post-revolutionary administration under Prime Minister Pashinyan achieved and where has it fallen short? A definitive achievement has been the eradication of interference by crime bosses and “district kingpins” in electoral processes. A second major breakthrough has been a noticeable reduction in the levels of fear and violence that privileged circles had previously injected into daily social life. Individuals backed by the state and their associates can no longer employ violence against ordinary citizens with impunity. The accessibility and inclusivity of political and economic institutions for various social strata and communities have also expanded significantly. Despite isolated instances of corrupt practice, systemic corruption — wherein the entire state apparatus functioned to generate illicit income for government officials and their patrons — has been defeated. While other positive changes have occurred, the focus of this article remains on the dismantling of the vlast system. In sum, the privileged position of those embodying the vlast value system has been undermined, and their decisive control over state and political institutions has been stripped away. 

Despite these remarkable changes, the influence of those representing the former criminal-oligarchic system has not been completely eradicated. This poses a threat of the vlast system’s resurgence. Actions taken by the ruling force that came to power in 2018 and reelected in 2021 and 2026, aimed at eradicating the influence of criminal-oligarchic tendencies within political institutions, have failed to meet the expectations of democratic factions, sparking widespread critique. The criticism mainly centers on the government’s failure to carry out political and economic lustration. Such vetting could have systematically and legally removed the criminal oligarchy and the vlast network from the political arena on a permanent basis, while preventing arbitrary decision-making and selective justice by current authorities. 

The 2026 Election Campaign and Post-Election Climate: Attempts to Revive the Criminal Subculture

The developments surrounding the parliamentary elections of June 7, 2026, confirmed the validity of this criticism. The refusal to implement comprehensive political and economic vetting — or at best doing so partially — alongside the absence of systemic measures enabled the resurgence of criminal and quasi-criminal forces representing the vlast system in their attempts to distort the popular will. 

Certain opposition factions uniting the representatives of the “former regime,” the very embodiment of the vlast system, attempted to revive the practice of mobilizing the criminal subculture during electoral processes, a tactic previously rejected by the 2018 revolution. This was accompanied by efforts to reinstate widespread voter bribery. Wiretaps and audio recordings uncovered by state law enforcement agencies — which served as the basis for numerous criminal indictments — frequently featured terminology of the criminal subculture, including underworld monikers and various recruitment tactics. 

The election campaign also witnessed direct attempts by representatives of the criminal underworld to intervene on behalf of these opposition forces. Most notably, a statement attributed to so-called ‘thieves-in-law’ circulated widely, creating a public uproar. According to this proclamation, citizens voting for the ruling Civil Contract Party were threatened with humiliating social stigmatization and a “loss of status” within their local communities according to underworld concepts. The threat to humiliate citizens within a local community to coerce voting behavior is a direct form of violence. It constitutes a verbal and psychological assault involving the threat of moral humiliation which carries an inherent risk of escalating into physical violence. 

Numerous documented accounts of criminal intervention indicate that, unlike the 2018 and 2021 elections, the 2026 campaign saw genuine attempts by the criminal subculture to reassert itself in political processes and revive the institution of vlast. The primary catalyst for this resurgence lies in the shortcomings and omissions of the post-revolutionary leadership, which has drawn criticism from reformist circles advocating for systemic democratic transformation. 

Lessons and Challenges: Instead of a Conclusion

This wave of criticism persisted into the period immediately following the 2026 parliamentary elections, when the incumbent authorities announced their abandonment of “velvet methods” in their struggle against the representatives of the former criminal-oligarchic regime. This shift was most conspicuous in the campaign against politician and oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, an episode that provoked mixed reactions not only from the “old regime” but also from political groups advocating for democratic values. 

The primary criticism centered on the spectacle of Tsarukyan’s arrest. Although he offered no resistance, he was apprehended with an excessive show of force — an operation seemingly designed as a performative measure to undermine his public standing.

The underlying criminal case against Tsarukyan was not new; however, the recent decision to remand him in custody is widely believed to have been triggered by an insulting remark he directed at Prime Minister Pashinyan during the election campaign. Notably, this is not a standard political insult. Tsarukyan promised to punish Pashinyan by placing him in a cage with a lion from his private menagerie, putting deliberate emphasis on the “male factor.” He used the Armenian word vordz — a term meaning a “male animal” and a “tough” male — which is tethered to the slang and practices of the criminal underworld. For Tsarukyan, a first-magnitude star of the former vlast system, such rhetoric is commonplace. However, Pashinyan’s response in this verbal exchange was equally unacceptable. The Prime Minister retaliated by threatening to lock Tsarukyan in a prison cell for the next decade alongside a vordz.

Rather than recounting the entire exchange of insults here, it is sufficient to note that while criminal rhetoric may be expected from Tsarukyan as an advocate of the vlast value system, it is entirely inappropriate for Pashinyan, who is at the forefront of the struggle against that system. It should also be noted that throughout the election campaign Pashinyan and his team in moments of emotional outbursts frequently deployed vocabulary characteristic of underworld rhetoric. 

Additionally, following Tsarukyan’s detention, authorities confiscated the live animals from his private menagerie along with his collection of animal figurines citing unlawful practices. While this may have been legally justified, the timing and execution of these seizures framed them in the public eye as an act of political vengeance and a display of power.

In discussing the history of the criminal subculture in Yerevan, cultural anthropologist Levon Abrahamyan references Robert Sheckley’s short story “Watchbird” in which mechanical birds created to prevent murder eventually evolve into murderers themselves. Abrahamyan uses this metaphor to illustrate how Soviet-era security units, initially established to combat “thieves-in-law,” ultimately adopted those very criminal practices.

In discourse analysis, it is well established that the language we use shapes our social environment. The adoption of criminal language will, sooner or later, lead to the emergence of corresponding practices within the political arena. Notably, just recently in the city of Abovyan, clashes involving criminal tactics were recorded between competing factions within the Civil Contract Party itself. Should this be interpreted as an early symptom of the “Watchbird syndrome”? While it may be premature to draw conclusions, it is clear that in the struggle against the vlast system rooted in the criminal subculture political actors must not succumb to the temptation of adopting criminal discourse and practices. The only viable path away from a criminalized political arena is to anchor our political culture within institutional and legal frameworks, while remaining open to democratic criticism.

The content of the publication is the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Heinrich Böll Foundation Yerevan Office – South Caucasus Region.